THE 2007 ROSS ELLIS MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITALY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES: IS THERE A GRAND STRATEGY IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY?
The 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies:

Is there a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?

By

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INTRODUCTION

In May of 2007 the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary (CMSS) and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), a Canadian international policy “think tank” based in Calgary, invited the Hon. David Pratt to deliver The Ross Ellis Memorial Lecture. He was asked to give his view of whether or not Canada can be said to have a “grand strategy.”

The Ross Ellis Memorial Lecture in Military and Strategic Studies is an annual lecture series launched in 1999 by CMSS to honour Colonel Ross Laird Ellis who was the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Calgary Highlanders for some six months in the fall of 1944 and into the winter months of 1945. As acting CO, he led the Highlanders in the last stages of the Battle of the Scheldt Estuary; as CO he commanded throughout the Battle of the Rhineland. Dedicated to his leadership abilities and military spirit, the series brings a renowned speaker in military and strategic studies to Calgary every year for lectures and seminars open to the university population and the general public.

Ross Laird Ellis was born in High River, Alberta, on 15 June 1915, the son of Clyde and Bessie Ellis. He enlisted in the 15th Alberta Light Horse in 1932, achieving the rank of sergeant in March 1934 and 2nd lieutenant by August 1940 as a Calgary Highlander. Ross spent six months as an instructor at Currie Barracks before heading overseas as a reinforcement. In Britain, he served as an instructor at the British School of Infantry. Mid-way through the war, Ellis was posted back to Canada as Senior Instructor at the Senior Battle Wing School at Vernon, B.C.

Ross Ellis returned to England and the Calgary Highlanders, becoming the CO of the Regiment by October 1944 and was later the CO of the 5th Infantry Brigade. Ross rose quickly in rank through service in fierce action and by the end of the war was a lieutenant-colonel. As a member of the Calgary Highlanders, he received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO), the 1939-45 Star, the France and Germany Star, the Defense of Britain Medal, the Canadian Volunteer Service Medal with Clasp (a Canadian Decoration, or, CD), the Victory Medal, the Coronation Medal 1952 and the Centennial Medal 1967.

Lt. Colonel Ellis retired from the Calgary Highlanders in December 1945 and returned to private business in southern Alberta. He continued to serve his community as town councillor, mayor and town administrator in High River from 1947 to 1966. Between 1955 and 1959, he was the Liberal Conservative coalition MLA for Okotoks – High River. He served as town Manager in Hinton, Alberta from 1967 to 1975 when he went to work for the provincial government as head of the Tax Research Council. He was later elected director of the Provincial Municipal Finance Council. Lt. Col. Ellis was the CO of the 153rd Company, RCASC, a reserve company. Ross was married to Marjorie Reid Scarr in England in March 1944 and they had two children. Lt. Colonel Ross Ellis passed away at the age of 67 on March 10, 1983.
Ross Ellis personifies the spirit of those Canadians who stepped forward to serve the nation and the great cause of justice and freedom in the struggle to defeat Nazism and Fascism in the Second World War. The vast majority of the more than 1.1 million Canadians who served were volunteers like him, men and women who gave up home, hearth and the comfort of family to risk their lives in the far corners of the world. Over 40,000 never returned. Many of the rest came home after the war to build a new nation based on the time-honoured principles of liberty and justice, hard work, and public service. When we honour the memory of Ross Ellis, we honour the endeavours of them all.

David Pratt is particularly suited to address the subject of Canadian grand strategy. Mr. Pratt had a distinguished career as a municipal politician before entering the House of Commons in 1997. His keen interest in defence and security matters eventually led him to the Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and he also served as the first chair of the Liberal Caucus Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and International Cooperation. In December 2003, he was sworn into the Privy Council as Canada’s 36th Minister of National Defence. Following his political career, he has provided strategic counsel to the Canadian Red Cross where he is now Special Advisor, Auxiliary Role Project. His deep knowledge of Canadian military matters and foreign policy and his latest career in the world of humanitarianism make him uniquely qualified to speak on this subject.

Dr. David Bercuson

Director
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies

Director of Programs
Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute
LECTURE ONE: STRATEGY AND GRAND STRATEGY
June 12, 2007

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me begin by saying how pleased I am to be with you today and to have the privilege of delivering this year’s Ellis Lectures, the ninth thus far. And please allow me to offer a special thanks to David Bercuson for inviting me to be part of this important lecture series. As you know, these lectures honour the memory of Lt. Colonel Ross Ellis, the Commander of the Calgary Highlanders. They are dedicated to his leadership abilities and military spirit. One cannot read his biography without being struck that this was someone who represented the very best qualities of a citizen soldier. Whether it was his military service during the Second World War (including the hard fought and strategically critical Battle of the Scheldt Estuary), or his service as an elected representative after the war, his life seems to have been an intense, passionate and uninterrupted commitment to his country and his fellow citizens. As we reflect on our own civic responsibilities during these turbulent times, we should draw inspiration from the passion and energy Ross Ellis displayed and re-dedicate ourselves to the very high ideals of citizenship and public service which he exemplified.

The focus of this lecture series is, of course, on military and strategic issues. Last summer, when David asked me to speak at this event, I must say that I was very intrigued by the subject he asked me to address. He said, “I’d like you to answer the question: Is there a plan to Canadian foreign policy?” Now please don’t labour under the misapprehension that I was responsible for a question that I feel is ingenious in its simplicity. I was not. I give David full credit for identifying this particular area of inquiry. In fact, the more I read about the subject, the more I became convinced of its importance. Within this “research question,” I was responsible for changing the word “plan” to “grand strategy” primarily because I think it goes directly to the matter we are seeking to address.

In order to provide some structure to these three lectures, I have divided them up into three segments; three nights, three segments – so far so good. Tonight’s portion deals generally with the subject of strategy and grand strategy. I will seek to provide some definitions, some background and some historical examples of strategy and grand strategy from antiquity to modern times. Tomorrow evening, I propose to address some of the theoretical and historical aspects of Canadian grand strategy and will focus in on one particular period which I believe is rather pivotal. In the third and final lecture, I will offer up some thoughts on whether Canada currently has a grand strategy and the nature of the strategic environment we might expect in the years ahead.

Let me offer a disclaimer as well. I want to make it very clear that the comments I make are my personal views and in no way represent the views of the Canadian Red Cross or the International Red Cross Movement. As a neutral and impartial organization, the Red Cross eschews politics for some very good reasons. For the purposes of these lectures, I have been given what might be described as a temporary dispensation from my Red Cross neutrality although I don’t believe what I have to say is terribly controversial. So without any further delay, let me begin this little journey through what has become, at least for me, a very fascinating and important field of study.

For most people, “grand strategy” conjures up images of generals and admirals in smoke filled rooms pouring over very large maps and plotting the movements of army corps, naval task forces and massed formations of aircraft. As a practical concept,
“grand strategy” seems perfectly plausible for great powers – the United States, China and Russia. A half century ago, one might also have included Great Britain and France. And a half century before that, Germany would definitely have been on the list. But today, the idea of promoting a grand strategy for Canada would, it seem, leave one open to accusations of “delusions of grandeur.” Indeed, some might even suggest that the entire concept is “un-Canadian” in many respects.

As I will try to demonstrate through the course of these lectures, while grand strategies do indeed have a military component, they entail much more than just defence and security. And, far from being the exclusive domain of great powers, I will suggest to you (and I think this is strongly supported by the literature on the subject) that countries large and small should possess a grand strategy. Yale Professor Paul Kennedy has written at least a couple of books which address the subject of grand strategy. One of them, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, attracted considerable attention a few years back. The other, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, is a collection of essays on grand strategy and contains an introduction which provides an excellent definition of the concept. As Kennedy has observed, a grand strategy is, by its very nature, “a complex and multi-layered thing” which, I hasten to add, may extend over generations. But at a very basic level, a grand strategy is nothing more than a state’s (and a people’s) long term plan to survive and, one would hope, thrive in what can be an often chaotic and unpredictable world.

To better lay the groundwork for this discussion, let me try to provide some definitions of some commonly used terms that are typically part of this area of study. Because tactics and strategy have been important since the beginning of recorded history, it is probably no coincidence that the words tactics and strategy are both Greek in origin. The former comes from the Greek *Taktikē*, or the art of organizing an army. The latter is derived from the Greek word *stratēgos*, which combines two words: *stratos* – army and *ago* – which is ancient Greek for leading or directing. “Stratēgos” was used to refer to a ‘military commander’ during the golden age of Athenian democracy. Suffice it to say that since their use in ancient Greece, there has been an evolution in how these terms have been defined.

In the 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz, the famous Prussian soldier/strategist and veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, offered the following definitions of tactics and strategy from his book *Vom Kreig*, better known by its English title, *On War*. “Tactics,” he said, “is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win wars.” During the 1800’s, the principal concern of battlefield commanders (as it had been for centuries before) was in how to seek advantage by maneuvering forces in open terrain. A more current view suggests that military tactics are defined as the operational use of forces in a particular combat situation. Military strategy, on the other hand, concerns itself with the overall means and plan for achieving a long-term outcome. At the risk of confusing things, there is another important term which entered the military lexicon in the first 20 to 30 years of the 20th century courtesy of Soviet military theorists during the Russian Civil War. It is the methodology that is referred to as “Operational Art” which is intended to translate strategic objectives into tactical missions.

In *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Kennedy notes the complexity around what appear to be relatively simple definitions. For instance, tactics can encompass the techniques of combat that soldiers employ through to the maneuvering of entire armies or fleets – often referred to as ‘grand tactics.’ Also, a large single battle or campaign (the
Somme or Normandy) is said to take place at the ‘operational level’ – midway between the tactical and the strategic. His point is that while tactics can be analyzed and understood at various levels, the same is true for strategy.

The preoccupation of rulers and military leaders with “strategy” can be traced back at least two and a half millennia. Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, another ancient Chinese work entitled *36 Strategies*, Thucydides’ *The History of the Peloponnesian Wars* and to a lesser extent Plato’s *Republic* contain elements of tactics, strategy and even grand strategy. A soon to be published book by Yale Professor Charles Hill will in fact argue that one can find elements of grand strategy in other works from classical antiquity such as Homer’s *Iliad*, Aeschylus’ *Oresteia Trilogy*, Virgil’s *Aeneid* and Livy’s *The Rise of Rome*.

It is probably not possible to speak of strategy and antiquity without at least a mention of some of the great strategists of the ancient era. I have already mentioned Sun Tzu, but others would include Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Hannibal. At the time of his death at age 33, Alexander’s empire extended from Greece south to Egypt and east through Persia to India as a result of victories won in epic battles such as Granicus and Hydaspes. Let me draw to your attention a point of trivia that may be of interest. NATO and Canadian forces are currently operating out of Kandahar, a city Alexander the Great founded and named for himself in the 4th century B.C. The Pashto word for Alexander is Skandar.

Julius Caesar was of course at least partially responsible for transforming the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire with the conquest of Gaul and the initial invasions of Britain. The great conquerors Alexander and Caesar shared at least one trait: they were prone to weep at things we might consider odd. Plutarch wrote that: “Alexander cried when he heard Anaxarchus talk about the infinite number of worlds in the universe. One of Alexander’s friends inquired about the cause of his distress to which he replied: “There are so many worlds, and I have not yet conquered even one.” Similarly, Plutarch records that after reading some part of the history of Alexander, Caesar sat very pensively for a time and then burst into tears. His friends were taken aback and asked him why he was so upset. His reply was: “Do you think I have not just cause to weep, when I consider that Alexander at my age had conquered so many nations, and I have all this time done nothing that is memorable?” All of which is to say that you don’t become one of the great figures of history without setting the bar fairly high.

But, notwithstanding the accomplishments of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, the title “father of strategy” was given to Hannibal by a 19th century U.S. military historian named Theodore Ayrault Dodge. It would appear that few have challenged that assessment. Why did the great Carthaginian general and commander rate this moniker?

First of all, Hannibal was no misty eyed warrior. The historical record provides no evidence of Hannibal moping around and blubbery about what he hadn’t been able to conquer. His epic achievement came at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, when he marched his army, including war elephants, from Iberia (what is now Spain) over the Pyrenees and the Alps and into northern Italy. He defeated the Romans in a series of battles at Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae and maintained his army in Italy for over ten years without losing a major engagement and without any re-supply from Carthage in reinforcements or resources. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, the Romans paid Hannibal the supreme compliment by adopting many aspects of his battle tactics.
Just how influential was Hannibal in the pantheon of military strategists? The 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica says this of Hannibal: “As to the transcendent military genius of Hannibal there cannot be two opinions. The man who for fifteen years could hold his ground in a hostile country against several powerful armies and a succession of able generals must have been a commander and a tactician of supreme capacity. In the use of stratagems and ambuscades (ambushes) he certainly surpassed all other generals of antiquity.” Allow me to indulge in a little Hannibal trivia. It is said that both Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington regarded Hannibal as a ‘gifted strategist.’ The Schlieffen Plan, which was the basis of German strategy during the First World War, was said to have been inspired by Hannibal’s tactics at Cannae. General George Patton thought he was the re-incarnation of Hannibal. And finally, General Norman Swartzkopf, Commander of Coalition Forces during the First Gulf War was quoted as saying, “The technology of war may change, the sophistication of weapons certainly changes. But those same principles of war that applied to the days of Hannibal apply today.”

However, for as long as people have been engaged in armed conflict, strategy (and indeed grand strategy) has entailed considerably more than just a military dimension. In his introduction to Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, soldier and author Samuel B. Griffith wrote:

> Sun Tzu was well aware that combat involves a great deal more than the collision of armed men. ‘Numbers alone,’ he said ‘confer no advantage.’ He considered the moral, intellectual and circumstantial elements of war to be more important than the physical, and cautioned kings and commanders not to place reliance on sheer military power. He did not conceive war in terms of slaughter and destruction; to take all intact, or as nearly intact as possible, was the proper objective of strategy.

While the modern concept of “grand strategy” was unknown to Sun Tzu, his writings display a visceral understanding of it. He advised that, in the pursuit of national objectives, armed conflict was a very grave matter to be avoided if possible. It was, he said: “the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin” to be undertaken only as a last resort. For Sun Tzu, wars were best concluded quickly. “There has never been a protracted war” he warned, “from which a country has benefited.” Achieving one’s aims and avoiding conflict was by far the most desirable outcome: “To subdue the enemy without fighting,” he said, “is the acme of skill.”

In the twenty-five centuries since Sun Tzu, the debates continue to rage surrounding how national objectives are best realized and what strategies are best employed in the anarchic world of international affairs. Clausewitz advanced the understanding of strategy by placing it within a broader context. A few of Clausewitz’s famous dictums illustrate the point. The comment for which he is best known was that: “War is nothing but a continuation of policy (politics) by other means.” Clausewitz defined war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” The interplay between ‘ends and means’ that was central to Clausewitz’s thinking is illustrated by this comment:

> The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the War; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.
Strategy, he defined as “the employment of the battle as the means toward the attainment of the object of war.”

Strategic thought – both in terms of strategy and grand strategy – evolved and developed in the 20th century. Clausewitz was certainly not without his detractors – one of whom was the great British strategist Sir Basil Liddell Hart. In his famous book, *Strategy*, Liddell Hart examined conflict from ancient Greece through to modern times. He identified what he felt were internal contradictions in Clausewitz’s work and concluded that Clausewitz’ definition of strategy as “the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war” was defective. He noted, for instance, that it “intrudes on the sphere of policy, or the higher conduct of the war, which must necessarily be the responsibility of the government and not of the military leaders it employs as its agents in the executive control of operations.” Another problem according to Liddell Hart was that it narrowed the meaning of strategy “to the pure utilization of battle, thus conveying the idea that battle is the only means to the strategic end.”

Part of the problem with Clausewitz’s theory according to Liddell Hart was that although he insisted that war was subordinate to policy, his idea of ‘absolute war’ and the unlimited application of force grievously under-minded that first principle. As Liddell Hart observed “a doctrine which began by defining war as only ‘a continuation of state policy by other means’ lead to the contradictory end of making policy the slave of strategy – and bad strategy at that.”

As Liddell Hart has pointed out, Clausewitz’s work was a series of ideas which he had committed to paper over the course of twelve years. And in fairness to Clausewitz, there were indications that his thinking was progressing and maturing and that he was in the process of abandoning his original concept of ‘absolute war’ when his life was cut short by cholera in 1831. Before his death, he had sealed his work in packets that bore a rather significant and important caveat which read: “Should the work be interrupted by my death, then what is found can only be called a mass of conceptions not brought into form...open to endless misconceptions.” Notwithstanding Clausewitz’s proviso, his widow sent his manuscript off for publication in 1832.

The implications of Clausewitz’s ideas – especially those concerning absolute war and the unlimited application of force – were, to say the least, rather significant. Clausewitz had many early disciples not the least of whom was Field Marshall Helmut von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian and then German General Staff for 30 years from 1857 to 1888. It was, of course, von Moltke who was the architect of the Germanic victories in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars and his military successes served as a springboard for the spread of Clausewitz’s ideas of ‘absolute war’ among the general staffs of Europe. In fact, it is interesting to note that Moltke’s nephew, Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke, commanded the German army at the outbreak of World War I and, it would appear, was an ardent proponent of this uncle’s thinking.

As Liddell Hart has concluded, the implications of Clausewitz’s theories were enormous. Echoing Clausewitz’s words, Liddell Hart observed, “In consequence, the way was left open to ‘endless misconceptions’ far in excess of his anticipation – for the universal adoption of the theory of unlimited war has gone far to wreck civilization. The teachings of Clausewitz, taken without understanding, largely influenced both the causation and character of World War I. Thereby it led on, all too logically, to World War II.” Liddell Hart, as you can see, had some rather strong opinions on rather large issues.
Inasmuch as von Moltke the elder was a follower of Clausewitz, he was not uncritical of his views. He attempted to refine Clausewitz’s definition of strategy and described it as “the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view.” In von Moltke’s formulation, military strategy is clearly a means to a political end. Liddell Hart’s concise definition of strategy borrows heavily from von Moltke. Strategy, he submits, is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”

According to Paul Kennedy, one of Liddell Hart’s seminal contributions to the subject of strategy and grand strategy was refining the definition of what constitutes “victory.” It was also in identifying that the primary role of political and military leaders in grand strategy was to relate “ends and means”. As Liddell Hart explained:

> Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before. Victory in this sense is only possible if a quick result can be gained or if a long effort can be economically proportioned to the national resources. The end must be adjusted to the means.

From such a definition, it would be hard to conclude that there were any victors of the First World War save perhaps the United States. For Liddell Hart, grand strategy involved considerably more than just the organization and prosecution of a war effort. As he stated:

> Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will...It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity.

A contemporary of Liddell Hart was Edward Mead Earle whose book *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* also challenged some of the existing dogma on strategic issues. Writing in the 1940’s, Mead Earle expanded the definition of strategy and grand strategy and the debate around the non-military components of conflict. For Mead Earle, strategy was:

> The art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation – or a coalition of nations – including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy – sometimes called grand strategy – is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.

Whether one is discussing strategy or grand strategy, both concepts are rooted in the idea of ‘ends and means.’ Although almost 200 years separate their writing, it is doubtful that Clausewitz would have any difficulty with Yale Professor John Lewis Gaddis’
definition of strategy which the latter described as “the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources.” For those of you interested in further reading on this subject, it should be noted that the three Yale professors I’ve referred to thus far – Kennedy, Hill and Gaddis – teach a course in grand strategy within Yale’s International Security Studies Program which specializes in grand strategy. I would also venture to say parenthetically that more attention should be paid to this subject in Canadian universities and schools of strategic studies.

In *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Kennedy honed the earlier definitions provided by Clausewitz, Mead Earle and Liddell Hart. In summarizing and synthesizing their views, Kennedy further expanded the scope and definition of grand strategy:

To begin with, a true grand strategy was now concerned with peace as much as (perhaps even more than) with war. It was about the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for decades, or even for centuries. It did not cease at a war’s end, nor commence at its beginning. This was, Liddell Hart, observed, the real point of Clausewitz’s observation that war was “a continuation of policy by other means.

The second component of Kennedy’s definition broadened the Liddell Hart discussion of “ends and means.” For Kennedy, it was not just about how to “win a war” but rather coping with the costs (in the widest sense) and the general issue of “husbanding and managing natural resources.” A third component involved the role of diplomacy in war and peace. The object was clear and simple – the need to win the support of neutrals, reduce the number of one’s enemies and increase one’s friends. The last element, but by no means the most inconsequential, was the issue of “national morale and political culture.” As important on the battlefield as off, it involved “a population’s willingness to support the purposes and burdens of the war – or the cost of large defence forces in peacetime.” Over the years, he said, grand strategy has come to include the non-military dimensions of conflict and the underlying political purposes motivating a state’s actions in the international arena. Kennedy summed up his definition as follows:

The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long term (that is in wartime and peacetime) best interests....it operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, tactical, all interacting with each other to advance (or retard) the primary aim.

Kennedy’s writings make it clear that grand strategy is not the exclusive preserve of great powers. Any state, regardless of its size, has vital and fundamental long term interests it must protect. So not only is it possible for a middle or smaller power to possess a grand strategy, it is essential. The strategies states employ to protect these interests vary greatly, but those that are successful always balance ‘ends and means.’ As George Kennan, perhaps one of America’s greatest diplomats and foreign policy strategists, once noted, “Capabilities are finite, interests must be also.” Where the interests of great and smaller powers converge, opportunities exist for both to positively influence outcomes especially within alliance arrangements. For a middle or smaller
power, its diplomatic efforts may result in influence with the great power well beyond that which it might otherwise be expected to wield. And for the great power, the support of middle or smaller powers has the potential to augment its own strategy so that the total can indeed be greater than the sum of its parts.

Kennedy’s important contribution to the subject of grand strategy was then to substantially expand the definition taking it well beyond the realm of a strictly military and foreign policy concern and well into domestic policy. Experience also suggests that for a state’s grand strategy to be successful, it must enjoy a high level of acceptance by political leaders of all persuasions and indeed the general public. It must have a clear conception of that state’s interests and values and must convey a unity of purpose that includes both clarity and predictability.

Let me now provide a couple of examples of grand strategies from some well known empires. Let’s start with Rome. Some have suggested that in the early years of the Roman Republic prior to Imperium Romanum, Rome did not have a grand strategy. At that time, armies were raised on an ‘as required’ or reactive basis. There were, at the time, no long term political goals and no permanent military capabilities to support those goals which are typically a hallmark of grand strategy. The earliest manifestations of a Roman grand strategy appear to emerge with the Punic Wars mentioned earlier. While Hannibal was playing havoc with Roman generals up and down the Italian peninsula, the Romans decided wisely to attack the Carthaginians in their homeland (modern Tunisia). Hannibal returned to Carthage at the behest of the Carthaginian Senate where his ragtag army of local citizens and veterans of the Roman campaigns were decisively defeated by the Roman General Scipio Africanus at the Battle of Zama in 202 B.C. Fifty or so years later during the Third Punic War, Carthage, by now disarmed, was razed by the Romans.

In an essay I would recommend by Arthur Ferrill entitled “The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire,” he quotes from a tongue and cheek historian named Will Cuppy who wrote a book called *The Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody*, the Roman and Carthaginian military systems were compared. Cuppy said, “The Romans and Carthaginians were very different in character and temperament. The Carthaginians had no ideals. All they wanted was money and helling around and having a big time. The Romans were stern and dignified, living hard frugal lives and adhering to the traditional Latin virtues, gravitas, pietas, simplicitas, and adultery.”

A more serious study of the grand strategy of the Roman Empire was conducted by Edward Luttwak in the mid 1970s in a book with the same title. Described as probably one of the best works on Roman history written in the 20th century, Luttwak suggested that Imperial Rome’s grand strategy passed through three phases. The first was what could be called the flexible phase, where borders were not clearly established and, where they did exist, were defended by a combination of Roman Legions or the armies of local kings and client states.

The second phase Luttwak described as “preclusive security” which was a rigid-frontier defence system which dated from the second century and which was best exemplified by Hadrian’s Wall. This perimeter security was no mean feat. During this period, the circumference of the empire was approximately 10,000 km. It was defended solely by Roman legions since the client states had been absorbed within the empire. The problem with this approach from Luttwak’s standpoint was that it created a “Maginot
Line” mentality. It also meant that attack from without or civil war or rebellion from within meant shifting troops from one part of the perimeter (albeit along an established road system) while leaving another part of the perimeter undefended.

This system was severely tested in the third century by both civil war and external foes. Rome was rife with internal instability for a fifty year period from 235 to 284. During this time, Rome had 20 emperors only two of whom died of natural causes. The barbarians, although not quite at the gates, were definitely present on the frontiers and one province, Dacia, was permanently lost to the empire at this point. It took the Emperor Diocletian to restore political stability and security at the end of the third century.

The third phase of Roman grand strategy appeared in the fourth and fifth centuries and was largely the work of Constantine the Great. According to Luttwak, it can best be described as “defence in depth.” Constantine created a large army with a central mobile striking force based upon a strong cavalry component. This field army could move quickly when required to bolster frontier defences which, by this point in the empire, were lightly defended because of the manpower needs of this central reserve. From a military standpoint, what sustained the Roman Empire was the extraordinarily effective battle tactics of its army, its well-developed logistical system and its engineering skills, especially related to siege warfare.

But as we know, grand strategy consists of more than simply military considerations. It also entails political, diplomatic and economic components. On an economic level, war was generally quite profitable for Rome as they conquered the richest areas of the Mediterranean. But there were exceptions to this. Britain, the Rhineland and Dacia were definitely cost centres for the empire and there was never any return on the military investment to the Imperial treasury. Records show that in the second century, military expenditures absorbed about half the Roman budget of 800 million sesterces. To give some idea as to value, the average Roman soldier was paid about 900 sesterces per annum in the first century. But Romans were not taxed heavily with average taxes amounting to about 10 percent of income. What was critical to Roman grand strategy was the peace and stability that Rome brought to conquered lands – the famous Pax Romana – and the loyalty the Romans engendered among the local populations of conquered territories. From areas that had been pacified came a ready source of recruits which could be utilized to fight in areas that were less amenable to the idea of Roman rule.

The eventual fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD is attributable to various causes. One source indicates that at last count there were about 210 different theories for the fall of Rome. These include, but clearly not limited to, the decline of civic virtue, the rise of Christianity, cultural dilution, moral decay, and one that I’m really fond of is the invention of the horseshoe in Germany in the second century which was reputed to have revolutionized the use of cavalry. But Arthur Ferrill, whose work I mentioned earlier, believes strongly that the defence in depth grand strategy gradually fell apart. The frontiers were neglected, soldiers were placed in cities where they were not needed and where they became a burden. Importantly, the discipline and tactics of the Roman Legions declined as the Romans began to use more and more Germanic troops to supplement their strength. By the end of the fourth century, it was estimated that about half of a Roman field army was composed of barbarians. So in the end, the central striking force was unable to respond and the old frontiers of the Roman Empire ceased to have any meaning or any defence.
The fact that the Roman Empire lasted for 500 years, and that the Roman Republic existed for 500 years before that, is reason enough to try to better understand the Roman phenomena. The secret of its success seems to have been a series of grand strategies which steadily evolved and adapted on a military, political, diplomatic, economic and even cultural level to meet the changing needs and circumstances of the day. But the last word on the subject must go to Edward Gibbon, author of the classic work *The Decline and fall of the Roman Empire*. Gibbon said “the decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity,” he said, “ripened the principle of decay; the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and, as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight.”

I would like to say at least a few words about Pax Britannica, because, like Pax Romana, it too had a profound impact on the Western World. Pax Britannica is usually associated with the period from 1805 or, alternatively, 1815 to 1914. The 1805 date marks the Battle of Trafalgar, in which Admiral Horatio Nelson defeated a combined French and Spanish fleet off the coast of Spain to launch a period of unrivalled sea supremacy by Great Britain. And, of course, 1815 marks the Battle of Waterloo and the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The latter date 1914, of course, marks the beginning of the First World War, that began a rather precipitous decline in British power and empire that was all but completed with the conclusion of the Second World War. Nevertheless, many observers believe the success of British grand strategy during this period was based upon three inter-related factors. The first involved control of the naval trade routes and unchallenged sea power. The second was the policy of laissez-faire liberalism, the growth in British industrial power and the acquisition of colonies. And the third was in the realm of finance where the British system of banking, insurance, stock markets and foreign investment made London the financial capital of the world.

The success of Pax Britannica and the British Empire is also noteworthy for its size, if not necessarily its longevity. At its zenith in 1921, the British Empire covered about 36.6 million km², or, about a quarter of Earth's total land area. Within its boundaries resided a population of about 458 million people, again about one-quarter of the world's population. In terms of historic empires, the British Empire ranks first narrowly edging out the Mongol Empire of Kubla Khan of the 13th century which, at its height, covered 33.2 million km². It may interest you to know that the third largest empire in human history was the Soviet empire which, at its peak, between 1945 and 1989, contained 26.1 million km². Since I mentioned the Roman and Macedonian empires, it is worth noting that the former, under the Emperor Trajan, and the latter, under Alexander the Great, rank 18th and 20th respectively with 5.6 and 5.4 million km².

Like Roman grand strategy’s reliance on the skills and tactics of the Roman legion, British grand strategy relied on the skills and tactics of British seamanship honed over several hundred years. The excellence of the British Navy, like that of the Roman Legion, meant that they were also a superb and cost effective means of projecting power. It was not just the quality of the British Navy that was a factor, but its size as well. As Stalin said of World War II Soviet tank production, “quantity has a quality all its own.” During the 19th century, there were periods when the British Navy was as large as the next three or four largest navies. And by 1905, on the eve of the First World War, Britain still had a navy equal to that of the next two largest navies combined. For much of its history, Great Britain’s ‘blue water’ grand strategy meant that it could defend itself very easily from invasion by maintaining control of the English Channel and North Sea. In
terms of its merchant navy, by the mid 19th century over one third of the world’s maritime trade was carried in British ships and this figure was increasing.

Notwithstanding British command of the high seas and its investment in naval assets, what is quite remarkable about the period of British supremacy in the 19th century was how little it actually spent on its military. In 1816, Britain had 255,000 military personnel and ranked second after Russia. By 1880, that figure had declined slightly to 248,000, but Britain’s rank among the major powers was down to fifth. The “poor, bloody infantry” were poor indeed and the British Army was a neglected institution for a good portion of the century as the lackluster performance of British troops in the Crimean War amply illustrated. In the fifty or so years after Waterloo, British military spending averaged about 2-3 percent of GNP which was less than 10 percent of the overall budget. So from a military standpoint, it is hard to come to any other conclusion than that the British Empire was run on a shoe string budget and that it was certainly not based upon preponderant land forces or overwhelming military hegemony.

Britain’s economic power began to emerge in the 18th century, but really started to outpace competitors in the 19th. As Paul Kennedy noted in *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*:

> Between 1760 and 1830, the United Kingdom was responsible for around ‘two-thirds of Europe’s industrial growth of output’, and its share of world manufacturing production leaped from 1.9 percent to 9.5 percent; in the next thirty years, British industrial production pushed that figure to 19.9 percent, despite the spread of the new technology to other countries in the West. Around 1860, which was probably when the country reached its zenith in relative terms, the United Kingdom produced 53 percent of the world’s iron and 50 percent of its coal and lignite, and consumed just under half the raw cotton output of the globe. With two percent of the world’s population and ten percent of Europe’s, the United Kingdom would seem to have had a capacity in modern industries equal to 40-45 percent of the world’s potential and 55-60 percent of that in Europe.

With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the Navigation Acts in 1849, the way was clear for freer trade which opened up the British market to unfettered competition. It could manufacture products so cheaply and efficiently they could undersell comparable goods in foreign markets produced locally. In addition, with stable political conditions in overseas markets, Britain could enjoy prosperity through free trade with or without having to rely on colonization. But colonization proceeded nevertheless, and between 1815 and 1865, it was estimated that the British Empire grew by approximately 100,000 square miles per year. The growth in British financial power during this period was equally impressive. In the decade after the Battle of Waterloo, British foreign investments averaged 6 million pounds per year. By mid-century, they had risen to 30 million pounds per year and by the 1870’s, to 75 million pounds per year. The return on investment by the 1870’s in terms of interest and dividends was about 50 million pounds per year. This was largely re-invested in what became, as Kennedy has noted, “a virtuous upward spiral which not only made Britain ever wealthier, but gave a continual stimulus to global trade and communications.”
Gibbon’s observations about the fall of the Roman Empire could equally be applied to the British, especially his remark that “as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight.” The accident for Britain was the First World War which grievously drained it of manpower and resources. The Second World War issued the ‘coup de grace.’ At its conclusion, with anti-imperial sentiment running high in the colonies and the homeland, the proverbial end was near. The great Canadian writer George Woodcock captured it well when he said “the Empire was like an ailing old women, short of money but rich in jewels, with the relatives growing impatient for the estate, and not above hastening the funeral.”

Thank you for your attention this evening. Let me simply conclude this lecture by saying that I hope my comments having given you some appreciation of the concepts of strategy and grand strategy. As I will try to demonstrate in tomorrow’s lecture, British, and then subsequently American, grand strategy had a profound impact on Canada’s strategic situation; the implications of which are very much a part of our contemporary political discourse. I hope you will join me again tomorrow.
Hello, once again. In yesterday’s lecture, you will recall that I sought to lay out some basic definitions of strategy and grand strategy. I also attempted to provide a broad context for the discussion by very briefly examining the grand strategies of two rather important empires in the history of Western civilization – the Roman and the British. As I also indicated yesterday, the entire concept of grand strategy is not necessarily one that Canadians are comfortable with. There is a temptation to dismiss it out of hand as hubris and perhaps a concept that is based upon delusions of grandeur. I tried to dispel that myth yesterday, but I know that such impressions and conceptions can be rather difficult to eliminate.

Consequently, to better anchor our discussion, I would like to repeat the definition of grand strategy offered by Paul Kennedy, the eminent historian from Yale University. You will recall that this is how he described it:

The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long term (that is in wartime and peacetime) best interests....it operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, tactical, all interacting with each other to advance (or retard) the primary aim.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough that a grand strategy is nothing more than a state’s long term plan to survive and, where possible, to thrive. It is, as Kennedy has said, a “complex and multi-layered thing” that can extend over generations and that seeks to take into account a wide variety of factors. Grand strategy, in my view, is an intellectual construct – a tool – to be used by policy makers and academics alike to try to better understand what a nation’s long term strategic interests are, and to seek to translate those long term interests into long term public policy. That other countries are using grand strategy as an analytical tool can be found with a simple Google search. If your search engine is anything like mine, you will find articles on Australian, Japanese, Brazilian, German and Israeli grand strategy. Some of these countries are larger than us; some are smaller. But all countries have interests and values that they seek to preserve, protect and promote. There is, consequently, no rational reason in my view why Canadians should not be debating issues of Canadian grand strategy. More particularly, there is no reason why Canadian academics, those who bear the responsibility for research and writing on subjects of national importance, should not be actively pursuing this important area of study. Since that it more sermon than lecture, let me get back to the lecture.

Grand strategy is critically important to how Canada protects its long term vital interests and constructs its foreign policy. In tonight’s lecture, I will try to shed light on some of the basic issues of Canadian grand strategy from a historical and theoretical perspective. The first question I’ll try to answer deals with the historical aspect of Canadian grand strategy. I will attempt to take you through some of what I consider to be the most pertinent literature on the subject and answer the question as to whether Canada has at any time in its history had a grand strategy. The second question I’ll seek to answer relates to the elements of Canadian grand strategy – what principles should underpin
Canadian grand strategy and what criteria should we apply? The issue of principals is always a tricky one. As Marx once said: “Those are my principles, and if you don’t like them, I have others.” That was Groucho, by the way, and not Karl. I’d like to believe Canadian principles are at least a little more firmly grounded. Tomorrow, I’ll try to address some important future strategic considerations and answer the basic question of whether Canada currently possesses a grand strategy.

So let us now turn to the issue of whether or not Canada has ever had a grand strategy. Unfortunately, the issue of Canadian grand strategy has received a limited amount of academic attention. Of those whose efforts have been devoted to the subject, David G. Haglund of Queen’s University has by far the most impressive body of work. If you wish to pursue this subject further, I would strongly recommend Haglund’s book, The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited – Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End, which was published in 2000. I think it is important that we take a detailed look at his work. Let me say up front that I am in general agreement with much of what Haglund has to say from the standpoint of his theoretical and historical analysis which is rich in detail and demonstrates, in my view, a firm grasp of the subject. But there are some minor points of disagreement that I will attempt to explain.

Haglund believes that Canada has had, and continues to have, a grand strategy which is rooted largely in John Bartlet Brebner’s concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle.” Brebner, for those of you who don’t know him, was one of Canada’s great historians of the mid 20th century. He was born in Canada in 1895 and died in 1957 and for much of his career taught history at Columbia University. His most famous work, entitled North Atlantic Triangle, was published in 1945. According to Haglund, the framework of interactions and interdependencies in international affairs that originally involved Canada, the U.S. and Great Britain in the North Atlantic Triangle provides the metaphorical base for Canadian grand strategy. Haglund’s construct, however, has the British part of the triangle subsumed within Europe in the east and has Canada and the United States forming its western points. He views the historic connections and current relationships existing between Europe, Canada and the United States as the cynosure, or focal point, of Canadian grand strategy.

Haglund agreed with Brebner that the metaphoric origins of the North Atlantic Triangle can be traced back to the Treaty of Washington in 1871 between Britain and the U.S. Haglund takes the argument one step further by suggesting that the first manifestations of Canadian grand strategy arise from this particular Treaty. It is worth noting parenthetically that the Washington Treaty was a rather monumental accomplishment for its day. It solved a number of outstanding irritants between Britain and the U.S. including fishery and territorial claims, reparations for the Fenian Raids and the Alabama claims. Decades later it was characterized by American jurist John Bassett Moore as “the greatest treaty of actual and immediate arbitration the world has ever seen.” The effect of the Treaty was to bring about an end to what historian Frank Underhill described as the Anglo-American “Hundred Years War.”

Within the metaphor of the North Atlantic Triangle, Haglund identified two separate policy dynamics underlying the execution of Canadian grand strategy. The first involved the “hard” protection of Canadian security and political interests while the second entailed the “softer” promotion and projection of ideas within Canadian foreign policy. Within the hard diplomacy rubric, the first tangible assertion of Canadian grand strategy came with the post-Washington Treaty “bookkeepers puzzle.” As Haglund observed:
This puzzle consisted in how best to manage relations with both Britain and the United States so as to be able to invoke the assistance of the former (Britain) against the latter’s (the United States) political (and perhaps military) pressure while at the same time ensuring that British desire for Anglo American rapprochement would not result in an “sacrifice” of Canadian interests.

Perhaps the best example of the “bookkeepers puzzle” came with the Alaskan Boundary Dispute. Even though Canada had a weak legal case, the unfavorable boundary resolution (from a Canadian perspective) demonstrated the perils of placing Canadian national interests on the altar of Anglo-American détente. For Canadians, it became increasingly evident that if our interests in relation to the U.S. were to be defended, they would be best defended by Canadians.

A second construct around the hard diplomacy typology was the “counterweight” metaphor. According to Haglund, the counterweight began to emerge soon after the First World War within the context of the triangular diplomacy involving Canada, Britain and the United States. Inasmuch as British strategy in the Washington Treaty of 1871 had been to avoid going to war with the U.S. in defence of Canada, after the First World War, Canada’s “grand strategy” seemed intent on increasingly invoking our “North American character” to avoid being drawn into Britain’s conflicts such as the Chanak Crisis of 1922. In this situation, the counterweight militated against the British connection. In fact, Canadian foreign policy in the 1920’s and 1930’s was remarkably similar to the isolationism which characterized U.S. foreign policy during the same period.

The bookkeepers puzzle and the counterweight were to Canada’s hard diplomacy what the metaphor of the “linchpin” and “Atlanticism” was to Canadian soft diplomacy. As the old British-American antagonisms subsided, the “linchpin” metaphor was employed to characterize Canada’s role between the U.S. and Britain. Generally, it was associated with the idea that Canada could make a unique contribution to the solidarity of the North Atlantic Triangle through its assumed ability to affect a rapprochement between the Triangle’s two great powers.

By the end of the First World War, that solidarity was strengthening to the point in which Haglund believed the “security community” was solidified and a “collective identity” was emerging based upon a “community of shared values” that included human rights, the rule of law and democratic governance. However, even though the ties were getting stronger, a general desire to steer clear of European conflicts was enough to prevent a “multilateral democratic alliance” from forming between the U.S., Canada and Britain in the period leading up to the Second World War.

By the end of the Second World War, Haglund says it was the concept of “Atlanticism” that animated Canadian foreign policy. While NATO was Atlanticism’s most important institution, it did not define Atlanticism in its entirety. And, inasmuch as there were hard diplomacy considerations (in response to a great power security threat), and soft diplomacy elements to Atlanticism, Canada’s “Atlantic vision” was predicated on NATO being more than simply a military alliance. Although solidly based on a security foundation, under Article II of the 1949 Washington Treaty (the so-called “Canadian” article), NATO was to be an expression of many of the idealistic elements of “liberal
internationalism.” I will refer to the famous Article II more extensively later. As Haglund noted:

> What started the Atlanticist movement was a happy marriage of liberal-institutional idealism and the kind of realism that comes from having a clearly-perceived great-power adversary. If ever there existed a “liberal-realist” security agenda, it can be glimpsed in the Atlantic vision of St. Laurent, Pearson, and other leaders in Canada and elsewhere in the expanded North Atlantic Triangle.

At the conclusion of *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited*, Haglund argues that Canada’s enthusiasm for NATO waned over the years because it was largely framed as an instrument of Western European security into which Canada poured substantial resources. In the immediate post Cold War era, Atlanticism, as expressed through the “community of shared values” and the underlying objectives of Article II, appeared to have re-ignited Canada’s interest in NATO. By the end of the 1990’s, this interest seemed predicated on a larger political role and a smaller military role for the organization. Most importantly, Haglund offered the view that, as NATO and its threat environment have changed, Pearsonian internationalism has evolved into a new doctrine of “cooperative security.”

It is important to distinguish between collective security and cooperative security. Collective security seeks to prevent conflict on the basis of the use of force in response to attacks against any member falling under the umbrella of a collective security arrangement. Because it commits members to war in situations where their own national interest may be unaffected, it constitutes an ideal, the realization of which is often difficult to practically implement. Cooperative security, on the other hand, would have states broadly define their national interests. This involves a less ego-centric approach to national interest; one that promotes “an enlightened self-interest that at the same time fosters international cooperation.” In the end, Haglund concludes that:

> Cooperative security, construed as a ‘realistic’ alternative to collective security, is Pearsonian internationalism. And if grand strategy depends upon the maintenance over time of fundamental foreign policy principles adapted to evolving realities, as it should, then cooperative security can be said to be today’s iteration of that grand strategy [Emphasis added].

I support Haglund’s view that cooperative security is today’s version of Pearsonian internationalism. However, I disagree with his contention that cooperative security is today’s iteration of Canadian grand strategy. There is no doubt in my mind that cooperative security is a component of Canadian grand strategy, but it does not explain it in its entirety. In effect, I don’t think you can be that categorical. Haglund also refers to Canadian grand strategy going back to the Washington Treaty. While Canada indeed possessed strategies to protect its interests, I would be very reluctant to describe those strategies as grand strategy. Even though Haglund supports Paul Kennedy’s wide-ranging definition of grand strategy, Kennedy’s definition presumes an ability by a country to exercise control over the levers of power, both foreign and domestic. In the last twenty-five years of the 19th century, Canada simply did not have control over its own foreign policy.
The beginnings of a more independent approach to Canadian foreign policy can indeed possibly be found in the Treaty of Washington. And this process was accelerated with the establishment of the Department of External Affairs in 1909, events during the First World War, Canada’s signing of the Treaty of Versailles and its participation in the League of Nations. By the mid-twenties, the Canadian Government and other self-governing Dominions within the Empire were on the fast track to “autonomous status” which was supported by the Balfour Declarations and the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930. The Statute of Westminster in 1931 merely confirmed a process that had been developing for some time. By the time of the depression, Canada possessed all the necessary legislative and constitutional power to conduct its own foreign policy. Ironically, the depression years were largely characterized by Canadian isolationism. As a consequence, it would appear that one can only really begin to entertain the concept of Canadian grand strategy in the post Second World War period when it can truly be said that as a country in full control of its domestic and foreign policy, we were firing on all cylinders.

Notwithstanding this relatively minor difference of opinion, I would say that Haglund has laid a remarkable historical and theoretical foundation for the study of Canadian grand strategy. In addition, I think he introduced a tremendously important concept into the grand strategy debate when he wrote “grand strategy depends upon the maintenance over time of fundamental foreign policy principles adapted to evolving realities.”

In the balance of the time I have available, I would like to suggest to you that, from a historical perspective, a very important chapter on Canadian grand strategy was written in the roughly ten to twelve year period that followed the end of the Second World War. Sometimes referred to as the Golden Age of Canadian diplomacy, it could also be referred to as the “Golden Age of Canadian Grand Strategy.” In my view, it started with the beginnings of the Cold War and ended with the defeat of Louis St. Laurent’s government by John Diefenbaker. It is also my view that Canadian grand strategy at the time actually amounted to a grand strategy within a grand strategy. In effect, Canada’s grand strategy successfully pursued objectives which were specific to Canada, but which strongly complemented the overall U.S. and Allied grand strategy of containment.

So what made this period special from the standpoint of Canadian grand strategy? First of all, let’s briefly revisit Kennedy’s definition of grand strategy. It speaks to bringing together all the elements of policy, both military and non-military, for the protection of a nation’s long term interests. It also operates at various levels from the political to the tactical. Let’s also consider in greater detail, Haglund’s assertion about grand strategy being defined by “fundamental foreign policy principles adapted to evolving realities.” Historically, perhaps one of the best statements of Canada’s “fundamental foreign policy principles” came during this period with Louis St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture speech at the University of Toronto in January, 1947. Although the speech is not well known, it set the benchmarks for Canada’s post war foreign policy in a way which was, compared to his predecessor Mackenzie King, both bold and imaginative.

Standing before an audience of about 2000 people in Convocation Hall at the University of Toronto on the evening of January 13, 1947, St. Laurent delivered the inaugural John and Duncan Gray Memorial Lecture entitled: “The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs.” Not unlike the Ellis Lectures, the Gray Lecture series was established at least in part to recognize an individual who served in the Second World War. Mr. George Gray of Toronto launched the lecture series in memory of his two sons, Duncan and
John; both of whom had, for a time, lived and worked in Quebec. Duncan Gray had died during the war of natural causes and his brother John, who had demonstrated a strong interest in Canadian unity, was killed in June of 1944 while serving as a Pilot Officer with the RCAF. According to George Gray, the objective of the lecture series was “to foster a clearer understanding of the contribution of French Canada and to develop a wider knowledge and sounder conception of Canadian citizenship.”

Most newspaper reports of St. Laurent’s speech focused largely on his remarks on national unity. And while that theme was indeed prominent, the larger issue he addressed was the basis upon which Canada should conduct its external relations in the future. As St. Laurent stated:

A policy of world affairs, to be truly effective, must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population. It is true that difference of opinion about foreign policy must continually be reviewed in discussion and debate inside and outside of Parliament. Such discussions, however, can result in constructive conclusions only if they take place against the background of a large measure of agreement on fundamentals.

St. Laurent’s speech outlined five basic principles he believed should form the foundation of Canadian foreign policy. “The first general principle,” he said, “which I think we are agreed is that our external policies shall not destroy our unity.” For St. Laurent, having been part of a war cabinet that dealt with the issue of conscription, the existential aspect of “national unity” was absolutely critical. “No policy can be regarded as wise which divides the people whose effort and resources must put it into effect.”

The second principle he referred to was “political liberty.” It was, he said, “an inheritance from both our French and English backgrounds” and added that “we are all conscious of the danger to our own political institutions when freedom is attacked in other parts of the world.” St. Laurent also observed that “we have come as a people to distrust and dislike governments which rule by force and which suppress free comment on their activities. We know that stability is lacking where consent is absent.”

Third among the principles St. Laurent outlined was respect for the “rule of law” which he viewed as a “necessary antecedent to self-government.” Knitting the second and third principles together, St. Laurent declared that:

The first great victory on the road to freedom was the establishment in early modern times of the principle that both governments and peoples were subject to the impartial administration of the courts. Only then could the further step be taken by which the people gave their consent to the laws by which they were governed.

Reflecting on the still fresh memories of the recent war, he said when states act in a lawless manner, chaos is the result. While noting the development of international law was in its infancy, St. Laurent also added confidently: “I feel sure, however, that we in
this country are agreed that the freedom of nations depends upon the rule of law among states.”

The fourth principle he advanced was that Canadian foreign policy could be neither consistent nor coherent unless rooted in “human values.” Influenced by conceptions of good and evil, St. Laurent said Canadian values place “emphasis on the importance of the individual, on the place of moral principles in the conduct of human relations (and) on standards of judgement which transcend mere material well-being.” He said we must exhibit the same values in world affairs and “seek to protect and nurture them.”

The fifth and final principle St. Laurent outlined was our “willingness to accept our international responsibilities.” He lamented that over the years this “sense of political responsibility” in international affairs had not proceeded as quickly as some might have hoped. He did, however, observe “a perceptible growth” in this new sense of responsibility and that “again and again on the major questions of participation in international organization, both in peace and war, we have taken our decision to be present.” He ended the discussion of this last principle on an important point: “If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization.”

Although most historians feel that there was nothing terribly new about what St. Laurent had said, what was very important was the simple and unprecedented fact of issuing a statement of principles. Ironically, even though Mackenzie King had deftly managed Canada’s war effort and foreign policy on the basis of the same principles St. Laurent enunciated, he was too wily a politician ever to commit to declarations or standards by which his government could be judged.

The principles St. Laurent identified definitely help us understand Canadian grand strategy. But I believe it is also important to overlay a theoretical framework on grand strategy. In other words, for a grand strategy to exist, in addition to being a long term “inter-generational plan,” I believe it must meet certain criteria. I would like to offer the following five criteria. First, I believe a grand strategy must enjoy a high level of political acceptance. Second, it must have a clear conception of threats, interests and values. Third, it must convey a unity of purpose that provides for both clarity and predictability for allies and rivals (both existing and potential). Fourth, it must be willing and able to apply elements of both hard (military) and soft power (diplomacy, values) as required to achieve national objectives. Preference at all times should always be given to the latter. And finally, fifth, it should be flexible and subject to frequent re-assessment. If you read Kennedy, Liddell Hart and Meade Earle you will find elements of these criteria in their writings. What I have tried to do is to distill their thinking down into some form of understandable criteria so as to better understand the phenomena of grand strategy.

One cannot understand what I would like to describe as the “Golden Age of Canadian Grand Strategy” without understanding the historical setting. In this respect, I am reminded of Shakespeare’s character Malvolio in Twelfth Night. He said, and I quote: “In my stars I am above thee; but be not afraid of greatness: some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon ‘em.” I don’t think one could come to any other conclusion but that events at the end of the Second World War meant that Canada had grand strategy thrust upon it.
Let's consider the historical backdrop. When St. Laurent's delivered his Gray Lecture speech in January, 1947, the peace that ended the Second World War was barely 17 months old. Most of Europe still lay in ruins. The economies of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan were struggling to recover from the ravages of war. Although Canada and the U.S. had sustained significant casualties, both countries escaped the terrible physical devastation of Europe and emerged from the conflict with their agricultural and industrial sectors booming. Canadians had also seen their small industrial base mushroom in size over the war. As Europe re-built, our agricultural and industrial products and technology were in high demand. The vagaries of war had also placed Canada in an unprecedented position of military strength. By war's end, the country had the third largest navy in the world, the fourth largest air force and an army of six divisions. Interestingly, within the space of a few short years, Canada de-mobilized and then re-mobilized to confront the challenges of Soviet expansionism.

The confluence of economic and military power and the serious foreign policy responsibilities that flowed from it required the Canadian Government to carefully re-think its external relations. This meant a more activist foreign policy that would have been unthinkable only a few short years before. It meant moving beyond Prime Minister Mackenzie King's exceedingly cautious and restrained pre-war foreign policy. Prior to 1939, King had focused primarily on relations with Britain and the U.S.. As previously mentioned, through the 1920's and 1930's, on matters of European security, King was strongly inclined toward an isolationism not unlike that of the U.S. In fact, the diplomacy of both Europe and North America generally left a lot to be desired during the inter-war years. The poet W.H. Auden captured it well when he referred the "low dishonest decade" of the 1930's. Before, during and after the war, King kept a tight rein on foreign policy by serving as his own foreign minister. However, on September 4, 1946, he finally relinquished those duties when St. Laurent became Secretary of State for External Affairs Minister and Lester Pearson his Under-Secretary. The two men were very much in the vanguard of a new approach to foreign affairs for Canada. Reflecting on this period in his memoirs, Pearson recalled:

> Quite apart from my high regard for Mr. St. Laurent as a man, our view on the principles that should guide Canada’s postwar foreign policy (was) very similar. We were both convinced that our country should play its full part in the international organization of peace and security.

Within months, that more activist policy was beginning to take shape, but it was more reactive than proactive. It can probably be said that Canadian grand strategy was a reaction to Allied grand strategy and that Allied grand strategy was overwhelmingly driven by a response to Soviet grand strategy. As Stalin's post-war plan became apparent, the Americans and the British were very much seized with the challenges of a new and very different strategic environment. A significant amount of strategic ambiguity and indecision, however, characterized the immediate post-war period. As Lester Pearson also observed:

> There was, of course, no effective Western response to Soviet policy in these early years; it appeared that Moscow’s advance would not stop as she brought under her control hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory in Eastern and Central Europe and more than 90 millions of people.
Outside of those countries it had overrun, the list of places where the Soviets were fomenting crises, attempting takeovers and just generally mischief-making was long. It included Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, France, Italy and Norway – and of course, Berlin. The situation was further complicated by the rapid de-mobilization of American, Canadian and British troops and the military impotence that followed. Meanwhile, the Soviets maintained their combat ready divisions.

The deep and abiding suspicions of the Soviet Union’s post-war designs were probably best captured in Winston Churchill’s speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. Referring to “these anxious and baffling times,” Churchill spoke of the threat to freedom, democracy and stability posed by Soviet expansionism. His speech, which included his ominous warning that: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent,” was an early clarion call for a new allied strategy led by the United States.

Less than two weeks before Churchill’s Fulton, Missouri speech, the U.S. State Department received George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from the American Embassy in Moscow on February 22, 1946 containing his detailed analysis of Soviet intentions. His message included the shrewd observation that Soviet power was: “impervious to (the) logic of reason” and “highly sensitive to the logic of force.” Kennan never believed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. He was, however, convinced that military strength was imperative. Nevertheless, his suggested approach to the Soviet threat leaned heavily on what today would be described as “soft power.” He recommended that the U.S. understand Soviet Communism, explain it to the public, maintain the health and vigour of U.S. society, offer other nations a “positive and constructive” view of the world, and finally, hold firm to “our own methods and conceptions of human society.” The concluding words of the “Long Telegram” continue to have resonance today: “The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”

Kennan’s views circulated widely within the State Department and the Department of Defence throughout 1946 and 1947. It was not until he published “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (under the pseudonym ‘X’) in Foreign Affairs in July, 1947 that the word “containment” first appeared in public. As Kennan noted, “it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” The first major U.S. initiative which gave effect to containment came in a speech President Truman delivered to a Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947. The Truman Doctrine gave financial and economic support to Greece and Turkey in the face of an armed internal Communist threat. It was quickly followed by the Marshall Plan in July 1947 which was intended to assist in the re-building of Europe and the strengthening of its economic foundations.

The military component of allied grand strategy began to take shape with the Treaty of Brussels signed in March, 1948 by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom. The treaty was a mutual intergovernmental self defence treaty which also promoted economic, cultural and social collaboration. This was followed in April of 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington which created NATO as an alliance for collective defence as defined by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Twelve countries signed the treaty including the five Treaty of Brussels states, as well as the United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland.
There can be no doubt that the most defining event for Allied and Canadian grand strategy in the early period of the Cold War was the formation of NATO. And the extent to which Canadian interests, values, needs and aspirations were captured in the treaty was an important litmus test for the success or failure of Canadian grand strategy. In order to make our presence felt in the world, it was essential that Canada leverage whatever power and influence it had with that of other similar sized powers alongside the United States. It was also essential that the Alliance give expression to the ‘community of shared values’ which, as noted above, included human rights, the rule of law and democratic governance. In that respect, the Canadian approach was very similar to what was being advocated by Kennan in the Long Telegram. That was one side of the Atlantic coin. The other side meant, wherever possible, using the power and influence of Allies to put restraints on unfettered unilateral American power. If we return to Haglund’s concepts of the counterweight and Atlanticism, we can see how both were critical in defining Canadian policy toward collective security and the “North Atlantic community.” NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, summed it up well when he said the purpose of the Alliance was to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out. These were all objectives Canada could heartily endorse.

Canadian government officials were among the earliest promoters of an alliance. As early as May 13, 1946, Pearson had raised the issue at a lecture he gave at Princeton University. There were other strong statements made in favour of such an organization by St. Laurent, Escott Reid, Pearson’s second in command, and Mackenzie King himself. On September 18, 1947 St. Laurent delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly that many see as the birth of NATO. The speech gave voice to the dissatisfaction and frustration that existed among UN members and offered a potential solution to the problem of security in Western Europe.

On March 22, 1948 official diplomatic talks got under way in Washington between Britain, the U.S. and Canada with a view to the establishment of an “Atlantic Security System.” From the start of the talks, the Canadian position was that whatever security organization was established had to be more than simply a military alliance. Taking their cue from the Treaty of Brussels, the Canadians wanted it to embody the strengthening of free institutions and have it promote stability and encourage economic cooperation. However, the option that seemed to find favour with the Americans was a simple unilateral declaration that an attack on any Western European country would be regarded as an attack on the United States. The position taken by Canada was that this guarantee was both unsatisfactory and inadequate since it would not have put in place a real system of collective security involving mutual assistance. As Pearson wrote to King and St. Laurent on April 12, 1948:

A unilateral guarantee smells of charity (in the worst sense of the word). The Western European democracies are not beggars asking for our charity, but are potential allies whose assistance we need in order to be able to defend ourselves.

In the end, the Americans dropped the idea of a unilateral security guarantee for Western Europe and the British also moved off their position which was an attempt to create some distance between Europe and North America. Canadian officials, for their part, were successful in having Article II inserted into the final treaty – the non military component of the Alliance. Article II states:
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

In reflecting on the success of this episode of Canadian grand strategy, one is drawn back to all of St. Laurent’s principles: national unity, liberty, the rule of law, human values and the requirement that we accept our international responsibilities. Interestingly, it is St. Laurent’s first principle of national unity which seemed to have a very direct bearing on the inclusion of Article II in the NATO Charter. As Pearson stated in his Memoirs:

One reason for our stand on this was, admittedly, political. We did not think that the Canadian people, especially in Quebec, would whole-heartedly take on far-reaching external commitments if they were exclusively military in character; nor should they be asked to do so. These domestic considerations, however, were reinforced by our dedication ... to the grand design of a developing Atlantic community, something which could never be realized through military commitments for collective security alone, urgent and important as these were at the time. Our effort to promote this grand design was an important chapter in the history of Canadian diplomacy [Emphasis added].

The establishment of NATO and the extent to which it reflected Canada’s interests and values was a tremendously important milestone for Canadian grand strategy. As we approach the 60th anniversary of NATO in 2009, the wisdom of the positions taken by King, St. Laurent and Pearson continue to have resonance for us today. It was truly a plan that spanned generations. In thinking about this important period, I believe very strongly that Canada’s foreign policy was energized, if I can use that word, by a very coherent, constructive and well formed grand strategy. I’m not going to re-read Kennedy’s definition of grand strategy, but I would hope you agree with me that it did possess both military and non-military components, it operated in war and peace and that its primary function was to preserve and enhance our nation’s long term best interests.

Looked at from another perspective, I believe if we examine this period on the basis of the five criteria for grand strategy that I mentioned earlier, it clearly satisfies all five conditions. First of all, the foreign policy strategy adopted by St. Laurent and Pearson had had very significant political support in Canada. The NATO treaty passed with the support of the Progressive Conservatives, the CCF and the Social Credit. There were two votes against it in the House of Commons. Secondly, there was a clear conception of threats, interests and values. Thirdly, there was a unity of purpose that provided for both clarity and predictability for allies and rivals (both existing and potential). Even though the cohesion of the Alliance was sometimes in doubt (and I’m thinking here particularly of the French), generally speaking the Alliance was not susceptible to the divide and conquer tactics that Hitler had used prior to the Second World War.
Fourthly, there was a demonstrated willingness and an ability to apply elements of hard and soft power. While the preferred course of action was diplomacy and the strategy of containment, a little over a year after the NATO treaty was signed, many Alliance members including Canada found themselves both on the front lines of the Korean War and adding to the military capabilities of Western Europe in what became a 40 year standoff with Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops. From this perspective, Canadian grand strategy as per Kennedy’s definition was truly operating on every level from the political right through to the tactical. Fifth, it had to be flexible and subject to frequent reassessment. As part of Allied grand strategy involving the containment of Soviet expansion and in the post Cold War period, there has been significant flexibility and reassessment over the years throughout the Alliance. Canada has been part of a process reassessment oftentimes to the chagrin of our allies.

Over the last two evenings, I have tried to whet your appetite on the subject of grand strategy generally, and Canadian grand strategy more specifically. Tomorrow, in the last of this series of lectures, I propose to address the issue of whether or not Canada currently has a grand strategy and address some of the larger strategic issues which are on the horizon. I hope you will be able to join us.
LECTURE THREE: CANADIAN GRAND STRATEGY – IS THERE ONE?
June 14, 2007

Thank you for joining me again this evening. Tonight, I propose to address some of the larger strategic issues we face and to answer the question of whether Canada currently has a grand strategy. In doing so, I have the rather interesting task of trying to pull together the various threads which I attempted to develop in the last two nights together in some sort of cogent conclusion. I’ve only got about 40 minutes to do this, so I better get started.

So let me go back briefly to the first night’s lecture and our discussion of grand strategy and my very cursory analysis of the Roman and British empires. As you recall the events that led to their demise, it is important to reflect on the words of that great British historian Arnold Toynbee, who observed that “civilizations die from suicide not murder.” We saw that in the Roman Empire with the neglect of the army and Roman values, the withering away of their frontier defences and the increasing dependence on barbarian mercenaries. It was a slow suicide, but a suicide nonetheless.

The British Empire was dispatched more quickly with the First and Second World Wars decisively ending Pax Britannica. In fact, so precipitous was the British decline that I think you can clearly identify with some historical justification the date that was the point of no return. Ironically, it was Canada Day (or Dominion Day as it was then known) July 1, 1916 that I believe marked the beginning of the end of the British Empire. It was the first day of the Somme offensive where the British – on one day alone – sustained 57,470 casualties – 19,240 of whom were killed. It was the bloodiest day in the history of the British Army. Once again, if we consider Liddell Hart’s definition of victory, it is hard to find any winners in a conflict that rather systematically destroyed five empires: the Russian; the Ottoman; the German; the Austro-Hungarian; and the British.

The broad sweep of history over the last two millennia – from Pax Romana to Pax Britannica – provides ample evidence to support the view that Pax Americana will inevitably pass into history. Today, that is a rather hard concept to wrap our heads around when the United States seems to be close to the pinnacle of its economic and military power. It would have been equally hard for a Roman citizen living under the Emperor Trajan to contemplate anything but the continuous expansion of the Roman Empire and its civilizing influences. The same might be said of a British citizen living in the 1860’s in the long and happy reign of Queen Victoria. And, as difficult as it is for us to contemplate today, there will come a time when the United States will no longer be the dominant world power. I think the weight of history supports that rather elementary observation. However, it is also tremendously important to keep in mind that power is relative. The United States can continue to grow and indeed prosper. But, the lessons of history are such that military and economic powers are very closely linked. Consequently, any country that surpasses the United States in economic power will sooner or later also surpass it in military power.

In Wednesday’s lecture, I tried to provide you with some thoughts on the historical and theoretical basis for Canadian grand strategy. It is important of course to understand that the rise of Canadian foreign policy strategy and grand strategy coincided with the decline of the British Empire and the rise of the American. Indeed, I would argue that geography and our linguistic, political and racial heritage within the North Atlantic Triangle has allowed us to ride the crest of two imperial waves and enjoy the best of both worlds in
terms of security and prosperity during the last two centuries. That is a long time for any country to be sheltered in the bosom of not one, but two superpowers. And, indeed that fact alone has been inculcated within our strategic culture in which Canadians enjoy and even expect almost unlimited security on the basis of a very small investment in defence.

As I tried to show as well, events at the end of the Second World War (which presented us with a group of almost terminally weakened European allies) essentially thrust a proactive grand strategy upon us. It forced us to focus on what our role in the world would be. In this respect, St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture was absolutely pivotal in taking themes that had been present in Canadian policy for years and molding them into coherent foreign policy principles. Canadian unity, liberty, the rule of law, human values and accepting our international responsibilities were identified accurately as the “Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs,” as the title of St. Laurent’s speech indicated. And once again, I would draw your attention to the important declaration by David Haglund that “grand strategy depends upon the maintenance over time of fundamental foreign policy principles adapted to evolving realities.” If one accepts that proposition, and I must say that I do, then I believe one can find the rudimentary foundation of a Canadian grand strategy in St. Laurent’s principles.

David Haglund’s identification of the North Atlantic Triangle and Atlanticism as the focal point for Canadian grand strategy was also critical. In effect, NATO became one of the primary vehicles for the expression of Canadian interests and values. I also agree very strongly with Lester Pearson’s observation in his Memoirs that the inclusion of Article II (the Canadian article) in the Washington Treaty of 1949 was a very significant diplomatic achievement for Canada. It was absolutely vital at the time for expanding NATO beyond simply a military organization and giving it expression as a “community of shared values.” In as much as Article II promoted these shared values, it was the security umbrella provided principally by the U.S. that allowed Europe to move beyond the power politics of the past and move forward with integration. This can be traced back to the Brussels Pact, was continued with the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, and was further bolstered by the Maastricht Treaty that came into force in 1993 creating the European Union. It continues to be a work in progress.

You will recall that yesterday I described the period at the end of the Second World War and the lead-in into the Cold War as the Golden Age of Canadian Grand Strategy. So, what happened to the vigorous Canadian grand strategy between the start of the Cold War and its conclusion? It certainly appeared to wither on the vine. I would suggest that there are perhaps three reasons for that. First, the European allies rebuilt and recovered from the Second World War in the late 40’s, 50’s and 60’s making Canada’s diplomatic and military commitment to NATO less important to the overall effectiveness and cohesion of the alliance. Second, I think Canadian politicians, notwithstanding our commitment to the principle of collective security, found it increasingly hard to justify spending large amounts of money on the defence of Western Europe. As the Cold War dragged on, we contributed less and less to the point where by the end of the Cold War and even today, Canada’s military expenditures and Alliance contributions are at a bare minimum. The third reason was the nature of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a country that had forsaken nuclear weapons, the strategic dynamics of the situation were such that the nuclear balance of terror meant that a large Canadian military contribution would have had at best a very marginal bearing on the strategic situation.
Looking back, we can see that a proactive Canadian grand strategy was there when our European and American friends needed us most. Our early contributions were disproportional. We were present at the creation, helped shape the structure of the Alliance and saw it through its early years with fairly substantial contributions to North American and European defence. However, in the period of the late 50’s, 60’s, 70’s and 80’s, Canadian governments of all stripes made a conscious decision not to play at the same level as we had in earlier decades. We maintained a smallish NATO contribution and took up UN peacekeeping efforts with great enthusiasm. These contributions were not without substance and, in many quarters, helped add luster to Canada’s reputation in the world. Unfortunately, some of the mythology around decades of peacekeeping has convinced many Canadians (mistakenly in my view) that peacekeeping is all we can or should do. This view misses the fundamental point that Canada, like all other nations, has interests to be protected and responsibilities to discharge which require the application of hard military power.

Having said that, the lack of investment in military and diplomatic resources also meant that for a good portion of the last part of the Cold War and into the post Cold War period, it would be safe to say that Canada was not necessarily at the heart of NATO decision making. We were not quite a rogue ally, and it wasn’t quite isolationism, but I do think we were largely playing in the margins. While government rhetoric – both Conservative and Liberal – spoke of engagement and Canada’s role in the world, the facts on the ground were such that the tools of statecraft – doing our fair share on a proportional basis – simply weren’t there. On the face of it, Canada was certainly not, as St. Laurent might have said, “living up to its international responsibilities.” Opponents of the smallish defence budgets argued that Canada had not learned the lessons of World War II, that we had a moral responsibility to better protect ourselves and safeguard Canadian sovereignty and that we should have contributed more to NATO, if only to show solidarity and unity within the Alliance.

However, from a national interest standpoint, it is also important to consider the flip side of the question. It is not unreasonable to ask why we would spend large amounts of money on defence and sacrifice other public policy priorities when the results of Canada spending a lot of money versus a little were largely the same. On a political level, in terms of the consumption of resources and the need for the public to support those expenditures, it became a fairly easy question to answer for politicians – both Liberals and Conservatives – in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s. If at least part of grand strategy lies in a policy to preserve a country’s long term economic and financial interests, it is, if nothing else understandable why some would argue that, based upon outcomes, Canada was right not to spend huge amounts of money on defence during this period. Today, Pierre Trudeau is not seen as a hard boiled foreign policy realist, but when he took power in 1968, one of the things he didn’t like about Pearsonianism was its ad hocery and its lack of focus on Canada’s interests. So was Canada simply looking out for number one? I’ll let you be the judge. But my view is that, taking into account all of the above arguments, we should have and could have devoted more resources to defence and diplomacy.

But setting aside for the moment the issue of whether or not Canada’s past defence contributions were sufficient, I believe we must also view investments in Canada’s military on the basis of means and ends. Defence spending, is not and should never be, an end in itself. Weapons systems are not art – we don’t buy them on the basis of their own intrinsic beauty – we buy them for a purpose. All of that is to say we have to make
very clear and well informed decisions about what our ends are, and make similarly clear and well informed decisions about what means we are going to acquire and employ to achieve them.

While we had these internal debates in Canada around foreign and defence policy, of course, the Allied Cold War grand strategy of containment was working its way toward a successful conclusion. If, as Sun Tzu said, “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” then George Kennan’s strategy of “containment” must be seen as one of the most successful grand strategies in history. When I read and re-read Kennan’s Long Telegram, I am struck by the extent to which its underlying philosophy owes much to Sun Tzu. You may remember Sun Tzu advised that in the pursuit of national objectives, armed conflict was a very grave matter to be avoided if possible. It was, he said, “the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin” to be undertaken only as a last resort. You will recall Samuel Griffiths analysis of the great Chinese strategist: “Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if these were properly applied war could be waged with certain success.”

Let’s briefly revisit Kennan’s approach to the Soviets. Of course, Kennan believed that military strength was absolutely imperative. Nevertheless, his suggested approach to the Soviet threat leaned heavily on diplomacy and “soft power.” As you will recall from the second lecture, Kennan recommended the U.S. understand Soviet Communism, explain it to the public, maintain the health and vigour of U.S. society, offer other nations a “positive and constructive” view of the world, and finally, hold firm to “our own methods and conceptions of human society.” Those words, by the way, could have equally been taken from the human values section of St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture. I hope you will also recall Kennan’s concluding words: “The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.” Again, as I suggested yesterday, those words should have resonance today. Nevertheless, in the relatively short space of 40 or so years, the third largest empire in human history collapsed, or as Edward Gibbon might have said, “the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight.”

I wouldn’t suggest for a moment that the Allied Grand Strategy of “containment” was without its problems or errors. It was certainly far from perfect and some of the mistakes cost thousands of lives. One could cite the folly of the Vietnam War, not to mention the human cost of the array of surrogate East versus West wars that took place largely in Africa, Asia, South and Central America. Also noteworthy was the collateral damage inflicted domestically in the United States through the “anti-communist” crusades of the 1950’s. Nevertheless, on the big balance scale of history, in my view, it is undeniable that the basic objective of Allied grand strategy was not only achieved, but surpassed. Keep in mind that the strategy was the long term “containment” of the Soviet Union. It was never so bold, or even so aggressive, as to contemplate the elimination of the opponent. The fact that a serious existential threat in the form of the Soviet Union was removed without the recourse to war was a crowning achievement that spoke to the intrinsic wisdom of Allied grand strategy. I believe it owed much to what Sun Tzu might have referred to as the moral influences in war. Almost twenty years after the Cold War, it is also important to remind ourselves that a hot war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have been beyond catastrophic.

The fall of the Wall had other implications for grand strategy beyond the demise of the Soviet empire. In his short but important book, Of Paradise and Power: American and
Europe in the New World Order, Robert Kagan analysed the relationship between the U.S. and Europe in the post Cold War period. Kagan said the Soviet enemy was not the only thing that disappeared after 1989. As he noted:

So, too, did the grand strategy pursued on both sides of the Atlantic to preserve and strengthen the cohesion and unity of what was called “the West.” It was not just that the United States and Europe had had to work together to meet the Soviet challenge. More than that, the continued unity and success of the liberal Western order was for many years the very definition of victory in the Cold War.

Following the Cold War, however, American grand strategy seemed to enter what might be described as the first period of strategic ambiguity. And one of the large questions that faced policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic was the future of NATO – what to do with one of the key security institutions formed to confront the now non-existent threat of Soviet expansionism. There were, of course, other issues on the U.S. radar; not the least of which was the first Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, the Middle East and various other flash points. The stabilization issues in the former Yugoslavia certainly kept NATO and the U.S. occupied, but there continued to be nagging questions about the future of the Alliance.

Still, the involvement of the U.S. in various theatres of operation world-wide did not seem to assist its strategic thinking or move it any closer to a definitive post Cold War grand strategy. The predicament of U.S. foreign policy was well captured by David Haglund when he wrote that:

A curious irony emerges in that the world’s only superpower, the United States, may actually have a tougher time than lesser countries in developing a grand strategy precisely because, for it, the international system has become “ultra-permissive,” meaning that the absence of a great-power threat deprives American leaders of the kind of conceptual guidance that a sense of danger contributes to grand strategizing. To be sure, the absence of a great-power threat has not meant that Americans will refrain from searching for a grand strategy; it does mean, however, that they will have a great difficulty agreeing on whether they have found one.

By the end of the 1990s, the United States was not the only country struggling with strategic ambiguity. Canada was in a similar boat. For Canadian strategic interests, as Dickens said, “it was the best of times and it was the worst of times.” When the Berlin Wall came down, Canadians like others on the planet heaved a collective sigh of relief. The demise of the Soviet Union offered up unprecedented and seemingly endless possibilities for peace as well as an opportunity to pull our troops out of Europe and take a sizeable peace dividend. As Hagland has remarked, there were many who were feeling that the trans-Atlantic link was passé and that there were other bigger fish to fry in the globalized markets of Asia and Latin America. The demographics of Canada also seemed to support putting more emphasis on Asia as more and more immigrants arrived from Pacific Rim countries. All of this seemed to militate in favour of a steady decline in the relevance of Europe, NATO and Atlanticism generally.
But neglecting the transatlantic relationship also meant potentially abandoning the presence of a European “counterweight” which had been a fundamental consideration in Canadian strategy for almost a century. Although there were strategic re-evaluations of NATO and some speculation about the end of NATO, it was never really threatened in the 1990’s. However, even speculating about the end of the Alliance was enough to make some Canadian policy makers jittery. Such a development would have meant that Canada’s only security relationship would have been with the United States. We would have been frozen out of Europe and relegated to the junior, junior partner in North American security – a prospect which was definitely not greeted with universal enthusiasm.

In addition to the overall strategic ambiguity that existed, there were also real issues brewing within NATO and the U.S.-Europe relationship generally. If there was one episode that laid bare these underlying problems, it was the military campaign against Slobodan Milosevic and the bombing of Kosovo. Robert Kagan has pointed to this as a harbinger of problems in the transatlantic relationship that would continue to grow. For instance, the Americans had concerns about the reluctance of many European countries to send Milosevic a clear warning without some form of UN Security Council resolution. When the bombing campaign began, the Europeans were shocked at the extent to which the operations showcased the impotence of their armed forces. U.S. military and intelligence capabilities were such that 99 percent of the targets were identified by U.S. sources and U.S. pilots flew the overwhelming majority of the missions.

Because the Americans were for all intents and purposes conducting the war largely by themselves, they naturally claimed the right to call the shots on how the war was prosecuted, both militarily and diplomatically. While the Europeans, and especially the French, seemed to want to ramp up the bombing campaign slowly and intersperse it with diplomatic efforts, the Americans took a different view. Sounding much like a follower of Clausewitz, U.S. NATO Commander Wesley Clark said: “In U.S. military thinking, we seek to be as decisive as possible once we begin to use force.” Throughout the campaign, the Americans were frustrated by what they regarded as “targeting by committee” as well as what they saw as a cumbersome and unworkable European approach. As Wesley Clark recalled:

> It was always the Americans who pushed for the escalation to new, more sensitive targets and always some of the Allies who expressed doubts and reservations. We paid a price in operational effectiveness by having to constrain the nature of the operation to fit within the political and legal concerns of NATO nations.

As Kagan noted, a few months after the war when a NATO minister was asked what the biggest lesson learned from Kosovo was, he replied that “we never want to do this again.” Still at the end of the day, both the Americans and the Europeans saw it through if for no other reason than to preserve Allied unity. Once again, to quote Wesley Clark: “No single target or set of targets was more important than NATO cohesion.” Kosovo definitely brought a range of problems in the transatlantic relationship to the fore. But there had been a steady stream of irritants in the Euro-American relationship which started with the Clinton Administration. Whether it was the future of UN sanctions on Iraq or the bombing campaign of 1998, the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court, one by one issues were accumulating and doing real damage to what had seemed to be
the cherished “community of shared values.” If relations were deteriorating before George W. Bush came to office, they hit a nadir in the months following the September 11 attacks and in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq.

The juxtaposition of the differences between American and European strategic culture was driven home by Kagan in the opening paragraphs of his book *Of Paradise and Power*. I apologize for this lengthy quote which many of you have no doubt read yourselves. If you have read it, allow me to refresh your memories. Kagan said:

> It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace.” Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.

Kagan was writing at a particularly bad point in the Euro-American relationship. In fact, it is hard to recount a period when the transatlantic relationship was as strained as it was then. You will recall the characterization by Mr. Rumsfeld of the “old Europe” and the “new Europe.” Relations between the Americans and the French and Germans were particularly difficult. You may remember at the time, Americans were refusing to buy French fries and U.S. talk shows were ridiculing the French in particular as “cheese eating surrender monkeys.” I don’t believe that the picture now is as bleak as the one Kagan painted. I’m not sure it was even as bad as the way he characterized it when *Of Paradise and Power* was published in 2003. But Kagan did, I think, put his finger on some of the basic differences between U.S. and European strategic culture and their approaches to soft and hard power. This was not exactly a high point in Canada-U.S. relations either in terms of the manner in which the Chretien government announced it would not be supporting the war in Iraq.

Since Kagan chronicled the low point in U.S. European relations, the prosecution of the Iraq War has done much to force a re-thinking of U.S. strategy. On the face of it, the concerns expressed by many European leaders in the lead up to the Iraq War appear in hindsight to have been solidly justified. So much of American credibility in terms of the casus belli for the conflict was undermined by the absolutely critical failure to find weapons of mass destruction. Had such weapons been found, the United States might be in a very different situation in the eyes of the rest of the world. Considered from the perspective of Sun Tzu, who was a strong believer in the importance of spying and knowing one’s enemy, the disastrously inaccurate U.S. intelligence around WMD meant that America forfeited much of the high ground in terms of the moral influences of war.
Of course, the U.S. sustained further blows to its “moral authority” with the issues surrounding the detainees at Guantanamo, the abuses that were exposed at Abu Ghraib and other apparent violations of the laws of armed conflict.

American problems multiplied further when, after a nearly flawless invasion that was strategically brilliant, the U.S. failed to apply some of its own lessons from the de-Nazification of Germany after the Second World War. Dismantling the army and the police meant that the country sank into a level of chaos and civil war that shows no signs of abating. There is a view that seems to have gained considerable currency over the last couple of years that the war in Afghanistan is the right war and Iraq is the wrong one. Supporters of this view point to the fact that the Afghan war is being waged by the United States and its NATO allies fighting Islamist radicalism under the authority of a UN Security Council Resolution. While one could argue whether or not a UN Security Council resolution is necessary for all interventions (I personally believe it is not in all situations, Kosovo being an example), there is little doubt that the Iraq War lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most Americans and indeed the rest of the world.

Overall there seems to a growing consensus that the U.S. does not possess a coherent grand strategy with which to respond in a comprehensive way to terrorism. When examining the post 9-11 U.S. strategy, writers such as Stephen Biddle of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College have argued that, in the “War on Terror,” the U.S. has not carefully defined the threat, its interests and what “end state” it desires. He takes issue with what he refers to as a lack of threat specificity which makes strategic thought difficult. The so-called War on Terror does nothing but confuse the situation says Biddle. As he wrote in an article entitled “American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment:”

Terrorism, after all, is a tactic, not an enemy. Taken literally, a “war on terrorism” is closer to a “war on strategic bombing” or a “war on amphibious assault” than it is to orthodox war aims or wartime grand strategies; one normally makes war on an enemy, not a method. Nor can one simply assume that anyone who uses terrorist tactics is to be the target of American war making.

He goes on to say that “terrorism per se thus cannot be the enemy.” Now this is pretty basic stuff, but Biddle makes a convincing argument supported by statements from the U.S. Administration that specifically reject a clearer threat definition or a narrower focus. After the 9-11 attacks, President Bush stated: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not stop until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” As well, the September 2002 National Security Strategy states: “The enemy is not a single political regime, or person, or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism.”

Biddle concedes that there are some advantages to casting the net broadly, one of which is to ensure that no terrorist threat is overlooked. A war “ostensibly against terrorism at large affords moral clarity and normative power that helps marshal public support.” It could also help attract the support of allies who face terrorist threats of their own. But the drawbacks of such a strategy in Biddle’s view far outweigh the advantages. As he notes, the U.S. Administration’s response on the so-called “War on Terror:”
...have combined ambitious public statements with vague particulars as to the scope of the threat and the end state to be sought. This combination of ambition and ambiguity creates important but unresolved tensions in American strategy...Eventually something has to give – the ambiguity in today’s grand strategy is fast becoming intolerable.

Echoing the early Cold War language of George Kennan, Biddle has suggested two broad alternatives for the U.S. if it wishes to create a coherent strategy: “rollback or containment.” Rollback trades a higher short term risk and higher costs for the possibility of a lower cumulative risk in the long term. It involves continued significant troop commitments and aggressive nation-building in Iraq. Containment would settle for more modest goals and entails lower costs in exchange for lower near term risks with an acceptance that the underlying causes of Islamist terrorism would go unaddressed. With President Bush’s announcement in January of 2007 of more troops and financial resources for Iraq, it would appear as though the Administration is opting for a partial “rollback” strategy. In general, Biddle takes no position on which would be the most effective approach – “rollback or containment” – but if there is one thing that is clear at this point, it is likely that significant long range and broader strategic decisions still lie ahead.

There have been other recent major studies on grand strategy, one of which was carried out by the Princeton Project on National Security in 2006 and co-directed by John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter. The aim of the study was indeed ambitious – to write a collective “X” article similar to one George Kennan had penned for the U.S. journal Foreign Policy 60 years before. The opening words of their study laid out the challenges facing U.S. national security strategy. The report states:

In the first decade of the 21st century the United States must assess the world not through the eyes of World War II or the Cold War, or even 9/11. Instead, Americans need to recognize that ours is a world lacking a single organizing principle for foreign policy like anti-fascism or anti-communism. We face many present dangers, several long-term challenges, and countless opportunities. This report outlines a new national security strategy tailored both to the world we inhabit and the world we want to create.

The report identified three basic objectives for U.S. strategy: a secure homeland; a healthy global economy; and a benign international economy. But the fundamental thrust of the entire report is that the world will be a safer, more secure, more prosperous and more environmentally sustainable, if and only if, the U.S. throws its strategic weight behind, and creates the conditions for, the emergence of more liberal democracies. It also contains a mix of realism and idealism which is certainly consistent with Liberal Internationalist approaches. As you can appreciate, there is a good deal of literature these days on future American grand strategy, much of which seriously questions the unilateral approaches that have found favour with the United States in recent times. But, most importantly, if there is an emerging consensus, it is that the U.S. currently does not have a coherent grand strategy.
So where does all of this leave future American and Canadian grand strategy? I don’t believe we will see the signs of anything that resembles a new U.S. approach in what remains of the Bush presidency. And I don’t think I need to go into detail about why this is the case. But what will a new U.S. grand strategy look like? Based upon recent U.S. experience, it is not unreasonable to believe that in the future the U.S. may be somewhat moreinclined to work closely with allies. Certainly, in light of the current Iraq situation, the U.S. Administration has received large quantities of advice that point in the direction of a whole lot more multilateralism and a whole lot less unilateralsim. One would certainly hope for a more collaborative and cooperative approach that is firmly grounded in American principles. These are, of course, the same principles which are held within “the community of shared values” that is NATO and the North Atlantic community. Frankly, I don’t believe the U.S. can ever achieve its global objectives without its friends and allies.

I believe the Princeton Project contains the seeds of some critically important ideas for the future. Perhaps the most important conclusion they came to was the fact that future U.S. grand strategy cannot be organized around a single threat like fascism or communism. Because the threats and challenges are multi-dimensional in terms of terrorism, nuclear proliferation (which may also have a terrorist component), pandemic disease, environmental threats and resource shortages, it seems evident that a grand strategy must also be multi-dimensional. There are also some very constructive ideas on the reform of international institutions, especially the UN. For instance, among other things, the report suggests expanding the Security Council, recognizing the “responsibility to protect” and ending the veto for all Security Council resolutions authorizing direct action in response to a crisis.

Like the rest of our NATO allies, Canada looks to the United States for leadership on strategic issues. When that leadership is absent, Canada’s strategic objectives suffer. Whether we like it or not, on a geo-strategic level, we are joined at the hip with the Americans. We succeed when the Americans succeed and attempting to de-couple ourselves from this equation is an absolute and utter waste of time. It was tried before in terms of the Third Option in the 1970’s and failed miserably. That is not to say that we should cease trying to diversify our trade and economic relationships – quite the contrary. We should always be attempting to expand our trade and diplomatic engagement globally. However, it is to emphasize that we must understand where our fundamental interests currently lie and where they are likely to lie well into the future.

You will recall I made the argument that during the St. Laurent/Pearson era of the “Golden Age of Canadian Grand Strategy” Canada had a grand strategy within the larger grand strategy of containment. The absence of an American grand strategy presents a challenge for Canada because, as the early Cold War demonstrated, we are at our best when we are working synergistically as part of a larger scheme with allies toward a common objective. Containment was spectacularly successful because it was based on the fundamental principles I just referred to a few moments ago that were of course entirely consistent with St. Laurent’s principles of liberty, the rule of law and human values.

Is it possible to have a Canadian grand strategy in the absence of an American grand strategy? I would have to say yes it is, if only to drive home the point that we should be focused completely upon working with our allies to have the Americans construct, in conjunction with their allies, a grand strategy that we can rally behind and support. This,
in many respects, goes back to my fundamental agreement with Haglund’s view that the North Atlantic Triangle is absolutely critical to Canadian grand strategy. It remains the focal point of where “we find our friends” based upon the concept of that “community of shared values” and first principles.

In terms of who our friends are, I don’t dispute some of Kagan’s observations about the differences between the U.S. and Europe, but I do believe what we have in common is still very, very substantial and, in effect, dwarfs the disagreements that arise from time to time. The fact that the Euro-American relationship went through a very rough patch in the last few years and survived – despite the American view that the U.S. faced a dire existential threat – is a testament to the resilience of the transatlantic partnership. Forty years of Allied effort together facing the Soviets down on the Central Front in defence of common values and principles is a hard memory to shake for both the Europeans and the Americans.

Let me now answer the question which is the subject of these lectures and that is whether or not Canada currently has a grand strategy. Based upon the direction I have been heading with my comments, it probably won’t come as too much of a surprise when I say I don’t believe we possess a fully formed grand strategy at this moment. American strategic ambiguity is clearly part of our problem, but it goes beyond that large and important factor.

If we go back to our criteria in regard to grand strategy, of course, the first involves having a substantial amount of political support for what you are attempting to achieve both diplomatically and militarily. In terms of current foreign policy, I don’t think we have that political support today in Canada. And that can be traced back to a lack of public understanding of why we are doing what we are doing in Afghanistan and how it fits into the larger picture of Canada’s strategic interests, international peace and security. Like it or not, for many Canadians Afghanistan is linked to Iraq and what has become one of the most unpopular wars in U.S. history. This, and the general ambiguity and lack of clarity surrounding American strategic objectives, have had a spill over effect for all of the allies including those operating in Afghanistan under ISAF.

Notwithstanding that, there has also been a general failure to communicate Canada’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan. And regretfully I think the responsibility for that is shared by both Liberal and Conservative governments. And of course, the political problem has become more acute for the Conservatives because of the increase in casualties.

The second criterion involves having a clear understanding of threats, interests and values. Again, I am not at all confident that we have in Canada a clear grasp of these concepts. As St. Laurent said, there will always be differences of opinion in public debate about what constitutes fundamental interests. However, I think the public debate to this point – especially as it relates to the Afghan mission and its wider strategic implications – has been largely superficial. The entire discussion requires a deeper and more rigorous analysis by all concerned – the Government, the Opposition and the national media – to lay the groundwork for a more informed discussion. One can only hope that a better understanding of threats, interests and values will lead to the establishment of a broader consensus.
The third criterion is that a grand strategy must convey a unity of purpose that provides clarity and predictability for allies and rivals. Despite backsliding on defence investments, by and large, during the Cold War Canada did display a unity of purpose within what could be described as the traditional tenets of Canadian foreign policy and support for the NATO alliance. Caught up as we are in a complicated post-911 world, however, there does not appear to be nearly the same political support for the general thrust of current foreign policy. A broad consensus around threats, interests and values simply does not exist. The clarity and predictability of the Cold War is no more. Even in the post Cold War period, however, our allies came to expect Canadian support for NATO when the chips were down, as was the case in Kosovo and in the former Yugoslavia. The current prospect of a unilateral Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan, however, would seriously undermine the unity of purpose Canada has displayed in the past and would do serious damage to the Canada-NATO relationship which, as we have seen in the past, has been the cornerstone of Canadian grand strategy since World War II.

The fourth criterion is being willing and able to apply elements of both hard and soft power. Once again, I think we can say Canada has been willing to apply elements of hard power consistent with its ability. The problem we have is that our ability is not what it should be based on the size of our economy. Canada still ranks at the bottom of NATO in terms of defence expenditures as a proportion of GDP and that is not likely to change soon. Still, if we see NATO in the years ahead as the primary instrument for international peace and security, future Canadian governments are going to have to be seen to be contributing more than just rhetorical support to the Alliance. The fifth criterion, involving flexibility and re-assessment, presumes the existence of an operative strategy that I believe does not currently exist.

All of that sounds pretty negative, but I think we have to realize that there are some positives as well. We have made some decisions in recent times that are both consistent with our strategic interests and that have moved us closer to being able to implement a grand strategy that has, as its basis, Haglund’s North Atlantic Triangle. We still have a way to go, but let’s briefly review some of these decision points.

First, despite the declining state of our forces, Canadian involvement in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo kept us current with NATO and demonstrated our continuing commitment to the organization. At a time when the Alliance faced some stresses and strains, that was important. Second, Canada’s Afghanistan commitment has, over the last number of years, demonstrated our willingness to take our commitment to the next level and accept some of the heavy lifting, especially in regard to the current deployment in Kandahar. Again, although costly in casualties, this has been very positive. Third, Canada’s decision not to lend diplomatic support to the war in Iraq has helped us in terms of our credibility with certain European allies. This places us in a good position if we think back to the metaphor of the “linchpin” and the potential for Canada to play a role in Alliance unity. Fourth, the commitment of recent governments – Liberal and Conservative – to invest more in Canada’s military, diplomatic and development efforts is a very positive development, but obviously it is one that has to be sustained and increased. And finally, fifth, for all its shortcomings, I would have to say that the most recent International Policy Statement of 2005, entitled “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World,” was also important because of the unprecedented manner in which it attempted to integrate foreign, defence, aid and trade policies. Indeed, it could probably be said that the document made substantial progress towards assembling some of the basic building blocks of grand strategy.
So what lies ahead? Earlier in this lecture I said that there would come a time when Pax Americana would pass into history. For some very good reasons, we, as Canadians, have a vested interest in seeing that happen later rather than sooner. This process will take some time and it’s really anybody’s guess as to whether or not it will occur in this century or the next. And notwithstanding American exceptionalism, history tells us it most certainly will happen. There are, I think, three issues which should be on the radar from standpoint of immediate American grand strategy.

The first of these is America’s moral leadership. I think this has taken a severe pounding in the last few years and I believe the U.S. must make significant efforts to re-take the high ground. From a strategic standpoint, this goes back to Sun Tzu’s moral and intellectual considerations within conflict. It is also consistent with Kennan’s admonition about not allowing “ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.” The invasion of Iraq, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are not fatal blows to American moral leadership, but there is no doubt they have done damage in the short term. In my view, the United States absolutely must adhere to and become an advocate of international law and, more particularly, international humanitarian law. This was the case in the early 19th century when the U.S. was an advocate for the Law of the High Seas and when it was subject to the unilateralism of the Royal Navy. The day will come when the United States will benefit from having solidly established norms in international law which will protect its interests. Grand strategy must always be about playing the long game.

The second issue relates to the current U.S. financial position. As of the end of 2006, the total U.S. public debt including intra-government debt obligations was about $9 trillion. In 2005, the public debt represented 64.7 percent of GDP. If unfunded future obligations are included such as Medicare and Social Security, this amount rises dramatically to a total of $59.1 trillion. By contrast, Canada’s total government debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated at 27.6 percent for 2006. The current forecast is that Canada is on track to eliminate its net debt by 2021. There is a temptation to be smug about our good management, but as I’m sure all of you know, if the U.S. has significant economic and financial problems, Canadian problems won’t be far behind.

The third issue is the rise of China. We all know about China’s incredible economic performance and its 10 percent growth rates. But contrast the U.S. financial position with that of China. At the end of last year, it was estimated that China’s foreign-exchange reserves would exceed $1 trillion. That is twice their level of two years ago and more than one-fifth of global reserves. This is the result of its large current-account surplus, significant foreign direct investment, and big injections of speculative capital in recent years. This influx of money would normally push up the Yuan, but the government has forced the central bank to buy up the surplus foreign currency. The growth in reserves has slowed but is still averaging a hefty $16 billion a month. China holds over one 1 trillion in dollar assets (of which $330 billion are U.S. Treasury notes). As you can imagine, if China ever decided to dump its U.S. dollars, it would wreak havoc on the value of the greenback.

It is also worth noting that, according the International Institute of Strategic Studies, China’s defence expenditures have risen nearly 300 percent in the past decade going from 1.08 percent of GDP in 1995 to 1.55 percent in 2005. In just the last year, Chinese defence expenditures increased by 15 percent. In the years ahead, there is no doubt that China is going to require substantial amounts of foreign natural resources to feed its economy and, in some places, it will need troops to protect its interests as is currently
the case in Sudan where 4,000 Chinese troops are deployed. China is of course not without very serious domestic problems in terms of its demographics, its environmental degradation and the potential for political upheaval. In fact, these problems, at least in the near term, may prevent China from doing anything adventurous or risky in foreign affairs. Having said that, China presents a challenge not just for the Chinese, but for the rest of the world that has an interest in seeing it develop in an orderly, stable and progressive fashion.

As we consider the growing prominence of China as a strategic player, it is important to ensure that the “community of shared values” as represented in the North Atlantic Triangle remains strong from an economic, political and military standpoint. Certainly an undesirable scenario would be to have China assume the mantle of world economic and military leadership as an authoritarian capitalist state. The only way to prevent that from happening is to ensure that China is encouraged with soft power to become part of a broader “community of shared values” that entails human rights, democracy and the rule of law. But all of this must be done by the Western allies from a position of strength and will require significant investment, political resolve and a carefully crafted and truly grand strategy for the decades that lie ahead. I am reminded of a quote from the writer Giuseppe Tomas di Lampedusa who wrote in his novel The Leopard that “if we want things to stay the same, things are going to have to change.”

As the focal point for Canadian grand strategy and hopefully within a larger grand strategy, this country should strive, in the first instance, to be a unifying force between Europe and North America. But Canada, like other countries, also has a role to play in engaging China and helping it make the transition from where it is now to where we would like to see China in 40 or 50 years – stable, prosperous and democratic. In addressing both our short term and long term security challenges and strategic interests, we must, as St. Laurent would say, “accept our international responsibilities” with all that that entails. As I end this lecture, allow me to quote from the conclusion of St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture speech about Canada’s role in the world. He said:

However great or small that role may be, we must play it creditably. We must act with maturity and consistency, and with a sense of responsibility…We must act as a united people. By that I mean a people who, through reflection and discussion, have arrived at a common understanding of our interests and purposes.
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CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the spread of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism.

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