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IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

“IS THERE A GRAND STRATEGY IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY?”

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LECTURE TWO

“Historical and Theoretical Considerations”

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Hello, once again. In yesterday’s lecture, you will recall that I sought to lay out some basic definitions of strategy and grand strategy. I also attempted to provide a broad context for the discussion by very briefly examining the grand strategies of two rather important empires in the history of Western civilization – the Roman and the British. As I also indicated yesterday, the entire concept of grand strategy is not necessarily one that Canadians are comfortable with. There is a temptation to dismiss it out of hand as hubris and perhaps a concept that is based upon delusions of grandeur. I tried to dispel that myth yesterday, but I know that such impressions and conceptions can be rather difficult to eliminate.

Consequently, to better anchor our discussion, I would like to repeat the definition of grand strategy offered by Paul Kennedy, the eminent historian from Yale University. You will recall that this is how he described it:

“The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long term (that is in wartime and peacetime) best interests….it operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, tactical, all interacting with each other to advance (or retard) the primary aim.”

I cannot emphasize strongly enough that a grand strategy is nothing more than a state’s long term plan to survive and where possible to thrive. It is, as Kennedy has said, a “complex and multi-layered thing” that can extend over generations and that seeks to take into account a wide variety of factors. Grand strategy, in my view, is an intellectual construct - a tool - to be used by policy makers and academics alike to try to better understand what a nation’s long term strategic interests are, and to seek to translate those long term interests into long term public policy. That other countries are
using grand strategy as an analytical tool can be found with a simple Google search. If your search engine is anything like mine, you will find articles on Australian, Japanese, Brazilian, German and Israeli grand strategy. Some of these countries are larger than us; some are smaller. But all countries have interests and values that they seek to preserve, protect and promote. There is, consequently, no rational reason in my view why Canadians should not be debating issues of Canadian grand strategy. More particularly, there is no reason why Canadian academics, those who bear the responsibility for research and writing on subjects of national importance, should not be actively pursuing this important area of study. Since that it more sermon than lecture, let me get back to the lecture.

Grand strategy is critically important to how Canada protects its long term vital interests and constructs its foreign policy. In tonight’s lecture, I will try to shed light on some of the basic issues of Canadian grand strategy from a historical and theoretical perspective. The first question I’ll try and answer deals with the historical aspect of Canadian grand strategy. I will attempt to take you through some of what I consider to be the most pertinent literature on the subject and answer the question as to whether Canada has at any time in its history had a grand strategy. The second question I’ll seek to answer relates to the elements of Canadian grand strategy – what principles should underpin Canadian grand strategy and what criteria should we apply? The issue of principals is always a tricky one. As Marx once said; “Those are my principles, and if you don’t like them, I have others.” That was Groucho, by the way, and not Karl. I’d like to believe Canadian principles are at least a little more firmly grounded. Tomorrow, I’ll
try to address some important future strategic considerations and answer the basic question of whether Canada currently possesses a grand strategy.

So let us now turn to the issue of whether or not Canada has ever had a grand strategy. Unfortunately, the issue of Canadian grand strategy has received a limited amount of academic attention. Of those whose efforts have been devoted to the subject, David G. Haglund of Queen’s University has by far the most impressive body of work. If you wish to pursue this subject further, I would strongly recommend Haglund’s book, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited – Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End*, which was published in 2000. I think it is important that we take a detailed look at his work. Let me say up front that I am in general agreement with much of what Haglund has to say from the standpoint of his theoretical and historical analysis which is rich in detail and demonstrates in my view a firm grasp of the subject. But there are some minor points of disagreement which I will attempt to explain.

Haglund believes that Canada has had, and continues to have, a grand strategy which is rooted largely in John Bartlet Brebner’s concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle.” Brebner, for those of you who don’t know him, was one of Canada’s great historians of the mid 20th century. He was born in Canada in 1895 and died in 1957 and for much of his career taught history at Columbia University. His most famous work entitled “North Atlantic Triangle” was published in 1945. According to Haglund, the framework of interactions and interdependencies in international affairs which originally involved Canada, the US and Great Britain in the North Atlantic Triangle provides the metaphorical base for Canadian grand strategy. Haglund’s construct, however, has the British part of the triangle subsumed within Europe in the east with Canada and the
United States forming its western points. He views the historic connections and current relationships existing between Europe, Canada and the United States as the cynosure or focal point of Canadian grand strategy.

Haglund agreed with Brebner that the metaphoric origins of the North Atlantic Triangle can be traced back to the Treaty of Washington in 1871 between Britain and the US. Haglund takes the argument one step further by suggesting that the first manifestations of Canadian grand strategy arise from this particular Treaty. It is worth noting parenthetically that the Washington Treaty was a rather monumental accomplishment for its day. It solved a number of outstanding irritants between Britain and the U.S. including fishery and territorial claims, reparations for the Fenian Raids and the Alabama claims. Decades later it was characterized by American jurist John Bassett Moore as "the greatest treaty of actual and immediate arbitration the world has ever seen." The effect of the Treaty was to bring about an end to what historian Frank Underhill described as the Anglo-American “Hundred Years War.”

Within the metaphor of the North Atlantic Triangle, Haglund identified two separate policy dynamics underlying the execution of Canadian grand strategy. The first involved the “hard” protection of Canadian security and political interests while the second entailed the “softer” promotion and projection of ideas within Canadian foreign policy. Within the hard diplomacy rubric, the first tangible assertion of Canadian grand strategy came with the post-Washington Treaty “bookkeepers puzzle.” As Haglund observed:

“This puzzle consisted in how best to manage relations with both Britain and the United States so as to be able to invoke the assistance of the former (Britain) against the latter’s (the United States) political (and perhaps military) pressure while at the same
time ensuring that British desire for Anglo American rapprochement would not result in an "sacrifice" of Canadian interests."

Perhaps the best example of the “bookkeepers puzzle” came with the Alaskan Boundary Dispute. Even though Canada had a weak legal case, the unfavorable boundary resolution (from a Canadian perspective) demonstrated the perils of placing Canadian national interests on the altar of Anglo-American détente. For Canadians, it became increasingly evident that if our interests in relation to the US were to be defended, they would be best defended by Canadians.

A second construct around the hard diplomacy typology was the “counterweight” metaphor. According to Haglund, the counterweight began to emerge soon after the First World War within the context of the triangular diplomacy involving Canada, Britain and the United States. Inasmuch as British strategy in the Washington Treaty of 1871 had been to avoid going to war with the US in defence of Canada, after the First World War, Canada’s “grand strategy” seemed intent on increasingly invoking our “North American character” to avoid being drawn into Britain’s conflicts such as the Chanak Crisis of 1922. In this situation, the counterweight militated against the British connection. In fact, Canadian foreign policy in the 1920’s and 1930’s was remarkably similar to the isolationism which characterized US foreign policy during the same period.

The bookkeepers puzzle and the counterweight were to Canada’s hard diplomacy what the metaphor of the “linchpin” and “Atlanticism” was to Canadian soft diplomacy. As the old British-American antagonisms subsided, the “linchpin” metaphor was employed to characterize Canada’s role between the US and Britain. Generally, it was associated with the idea that Canada could make a unique contribution to the
solidarity of the North Atlantic Triangle through its assumed ability to affect a rapprochement between the Triangle’s two great powers.

By the end of the First World War, that solidarity was strengthening to the point where Haglund believed the “security community” was solidified and a “collective identity” was emerging based upon a “community of shared values” which included human rights, the rule of law and democratic governance. However, even though the ties were getting stronger, a general desire to steer clear of European conflicts was enough to prevent a “multilateral democratic alliance” from forming between the US, Canada and Britain in the period leading up to the Second World War.

By the end of the Second World War, Haglund says it was the concept of “Atlanticism” that animated Canadian foreign policy. While NATO was Atlanticism’s most important institution, it did not define Atlanticism in its entirety. And, inasmuch as there were hard diplomacy considerations (in response to a great power security threat), and soft diplomacy elements to Atlanticism, Canada’s “Atlantic vision” was predicated on NATO being more than simply a military alliance. Although solidly based on a security foundation, under Article II of the 1949 Washington Treaty (the so-called “Canadian” article), NATO was to be an expression of many of the idealistic elements of “liberal internationalism.” I will refer to the famous Article II more extensively later. As Haglund noted:

“What started the Atlanticist movement was a happy marriage of liberal-institutional idealism and the kind of realism that comes from having a clearly-perceived great-power adversary. If ever there existed a “liberal-realist” security agenda, it can be glimpsed in the Atlantic vision of St. Laurent, Pearson, and other leaders in Canada and elsewhere in the expanded North Atlantic Triangle.”
At the conclusion of *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited*..., Haglund argues that Canada’s enthusiasm for NATO waned over the years because it was largely framed as an instrument of Western European security into which Canada poured substantial resources. In the immediate post Cold War era, Atlanticism, as expressed through the “community of shared values” and the underlying objectives of Article II, appeared to have re-ignited Canada’s interest in NATO. By the end of the 1990’s, this interest seemed predicated on a larger political role and a smaller military role for the organization. Most importantly, Haglund offered the view that, as NATO and its threat environment have changed, Pearsonian internationalism has evolved into a new doctrine of “cooperative security.”

It is important to distinguish between collective security and cooperative security. Collective security seeks to prevent conflict on the basis of the use of force in response to attacks against any member falling under the umbrella of a collective security arrangement. Because it commits members to war in situations where their own national interest may be unaffected, it constitutes an ideal; the realization of which is often difficult to practically implement. Cooperative security, on the other hand, would have states broadly define their national interests. This involves a less ego-centric approach to national interest; one which promotes “an enlightened self-interest that at the same time fosters international cooperation.” In the end, Haglund concludes that:

“Cooperative security, construed as a ‘realistic’ alternative to collective security, *is* Pearsonian internationalism. And if grand strategy depends upon the maintenance over time of fundamental foreign policy principles adapted to evolving realities, as it should, then cooperative security can be said to be today’s iteration of that grand strategy.”
I support Haglund’s view that cooperative security is today’s version of Pearsonian internationalism. However, I disagree with his contention that cooperative security is today’s iteration of Canadian grand strategy. There is no doubt in my mind that cooperative security is a component of Canadian grand strategy, but it does not explain it in its entirety. In effect, I don’t think you can be that categorical. Haglund also refers to Canadian grand strategy going back to the Washington Treaty. While Canada indeed possessed strategies to protect its interests, I would be very reluctant to describe those strategies as grand strategy. Even though Haglund supports Paul Kennedy’s wide-ranging definition of grand strategy, Kennedy’s definition presumes an ability by a country to exercise control over the levers of power both foreign and domestic. In the last twenty five years of the 19th century, Canada simply did not have control over its own foreign policy.

The beginnings of a more independent approach to Canadian foreign policy can indeed probably be found in the Treaty of Washington. And this process was accelerated with the establishment of the Department of External Affairs in 1909, events during the First World War, Canada’s signing of the Treaty of Versailles and its participation in the League of Nations. By the mid-twenties, the Canadian Government and other self-governing Dominions within the Empire were on the fast track to “autonomous status” which was supported by the Balfour Declarations and the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930. The Statute of Westminster in 1931 merely confirmed a process which had been developing for some time. By the time of the depression, Canada possessed all the necessary legislative and constitutional power to conduct its own foreign policy. Ironically, the depression years were largely characterized by
Canadian isolationism. As a consequence, it would appear that one can only really begin to entertain the concept of Canadian grand strategy in the post Second World War period when it can truly be said that as a country in full control of its domestic and foreign policy we were firing on all cylinders.

Notwithstanding this relatively minor difference of opinion, I would say that Haglund has laid a remarkable historical and theoretical foundation for the study of Canadian grand strategy. In addition, I think he introduced a tremendously important concept into the grand strategy debate when he wrote “grand strategy depends upon the maintenance over time of fundamental foreign policy principles adapted to evolving realities.”

In the balance of the time I have available, I would like to suggest to you that, from a historical perspective, a very important chapter on Canadian grand strategy was written in the roughly ten to twelve year period that followed the end of the Second World War. Sometimes referred to as the Golden Age of Canadian diplomacy, it could also be referred to as the “Golden Age of Canadian Grand Strategy.” In my view, it started with the beginnings of the Cold War and ended with the defeat of Louis St. Laurent’s government by John Diefenbaker. It is also my view that Canadian grand strategy at the time actually amounted to a grand strategy within a grand strategy. In effect, Canada’s grand strategy successfully pursued objectives which were specific to Canada, but which strongly complemented the overall US and Allied grand strategy of containment.

So what made this period special from the standpoint of Canadian grand strategy? First of all, let’s briefly revisit Kennedy’s definition of grand strategy. It speaks
to bringing together all the elements of policy, both military and non-military, for the protection of a nation’s long term interests. It also operates at various levels from the political to the tactical. Let’s also consider in greater detail, Haglund’s assertion about grand strategy being defined by “fundamental foreign policy principles adapted to evolving realities.” Historically, perhaps one of the best statements of Canada’s “fundamental foreign policy principles” came during this period with Louis St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture speech at the University of Toronto in January, 1947. Although the speech is not well known, it set the benchmarks for Canada’s post war foreign policy in a way which was, compared to his predecessor Mackenzie King, both bold and imaginative.

Standing before an audience of about 2000 people in Convocation Hall at the University of Toronto on the evening of January 13, 1947, St. Laurent delivered the inaugural John and Duncan Gray Memorial Lecture entitled: “The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs.” Not unlike the Ellis Lectures, the Gray Lecture series was established at least in part to recognize an individual who served in the Second World War. Mr. George Gray of Toronto launched the lecture series in memory of his two sons, Duncan and John; both of whom had, for a time, lived and worked in Quebec. Duncan Gray had died during the war of natural causes and his brother John, who had demonstrated a strong interest in Canadian unity, was killed in June of 1944 while serving as a Pilot Officer with the RCAF. According to George Gray, the objective of the lecture series was “to foster a clearer understanding of the contribution of French Canada and to develop a wider knowledge and sounder conception of Canadian citizenship.”
Most newspaper reports of St. Laurent’s speech focused largely on his remarks on national unity. And while that theme was indeed prominent, the larger issue he addressed was the basis upon which Canada should conduct its external relations in the future. As St. Laurent stated:

“A policy of world affairs, to be truly effective, must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population. It is true that difference of opinion about foreign policy must continually be reviewed in discussion and debate inside and outside of Parliament. Such discussions, however, can result in constructive conclusions only if they take place against the background of a large measure of agreement on fundamentals.”

St. Laurent’s speech outlined five basic principles he believed should form the foundation of Canadian foreign policy. “The first general principle,” he said, “which I think we are agreed is that our external policies shall not destroy our unity.” For St. Laurent, having been part of a war cabinet that dealt with the issue of conscription, the existential aspect of “national unity” was absolutely critical. “No policy can be regarded as wise which divides the people whose effort and resources must put it into effect.”

The second principle he referred to was “political liberty.” It was, he said, “an inheritance from both our French and English backgrounds” and added that “we are all conscious of the danger to our own political institutions when freedom is attacked in other parts of the world.” St. Laurent also observed that “we have come as a people to distrust and dislike governments which rule by force and which suppress free comment on their activities. We know that stability is lacking where consent is absent.”
Third among the principles St. Laurent outlined was respect for the “rule of law” which he viewed as a “necessary antecedent to self-government.” Knitting the second and third principles together, St. Laurent declared that:

“The first great victory on the road to freedom was the establishment in early modern times of the principle that both governments and peoples were subject to the impartial administration of the courts. Only then could the further step be taken by which the people gave their consent to the laws by which they were governed.”

Reflecting on the still fresh memories of the recent war, he said when states act in a lawless manner, chaos is the result. While noting the development of international law was in its infancy, St. Laurent also added confidently: “I feel sure, however, that we in this country are agreed that the freedom of nations depends upon the rule of law among states.”

The fourth principle he advanced was that Canadian foreign policy could be neither consistent nor coherent unless rooted in “human values.” Influenced by conceptions of good and evil, St. Laurent said Canadian values place “emphasis on the importance of the individual, on the place of moral principles in the conduct of human relations (and) on standards of judgement which transcend mere material well-being.” He said we must exhibit the same values in world affairs and “seek to protect and nurture them.”

The fifth and final principle St. Laurent outlined was our “willingness to accept our international responsibilities.” He lamented that over the years this “sense of political responsibility” in international affairs had not proceeded as quickly as some might have hoped. He did, however, observe “a perceptible growth” in this new sense of
responsibility and that “again and again on the major questions of participation in international organization, both in peace and war, we have taken our decision to be present.” He ended the discussion of this last principle on an important point: “If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization.”

Although most historians feel that there was nothing terribly new about what St. Laurent had said, what was very important was the simple and unprecedented fact of issuing a statement of principles. Ironically, even though Mackenzie King had deftly managed Canada’s war effort and foreign policy on the basis of the same principles St. Laurent enunciated, he was too wily a politician ever to commit to declarations or standards by which his government could be judged.

The principles St. Laurent identified definitely help us understand Canadian grand strategy. But I believe it is also important to overlay a theoretical framework on grand strategy. In other words, for a grand strategy to exist, in addition to being a long term “inter-generational plan” I believe it must meet certain criteria. I would like to offer the following five criteria. First, I believe a grand strategy must enjoy a high level of political acceptance. Second, it must have a clear conception of threats, interests and values. Third, it must convey a unity of purpose that provides for both clarity and predictability for allies and rivals (both existing and potential). Fourth, it must be willing and able to apply elements of both hard (military) and soft power (diplomacy, values) as required to achieve national objectives. Preference at all times should always be given to the latter. And finally, fifth, it should be flexible and subject to frequent re-assessment. If you read Kennedy, Liddell Hart and Meade Earle you will find elements of these
criteria in their writings. What I have tried to do is to distill their thinking down into some form of understandable criteria so as to better understand the phenomena of grand strategy.

One cannot understand what I would like to describe as the “Golden Age of Canadian Grand Strategy” without understanding the historical setting. In this respect, I am reminded of Shakespeare's character Malvalio in Twelfth Night. He said and I quote: “In my stars I am above thee; but be not afraid of greatness: some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon 'em.” I don’t think one could come to any other conclusion but that events at the end of the Second World War meant that Canada had grand strategy thrust upon it.

Let’s consider the historical backdrop. When St. Laurent’s delivered his Gray Lecture speech in January, 1947, the peace that ended the Second World War was barely 17 months old. Most of Europe still lay in ruins. The economies of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan were struggling to recover from the ravages of war. Although Canada and the US had sustained significant casualties, both countries escaped the terrible physical devastation of Europe and emerged from the conflict with their agricultural and industrial sectors booming. Canadians had also seen their small industrial base mushroom in size over the war. As Europe re-built, our agricultural and industrial products and technology were in high demand. The vagaries of war had also placed Canada in an unprecedented position of military strength. By war’s end, the country had the third largest navy in the world, the fourth largest air force and an army of six divisions. Interestingly, within the space of a few short years,
Canada de-mobilized and then re-mobilized to confront the challenges of Soviet expansionism.

The confluence of economic and military power and the serious foreign policy responsibilities that flowed from it required the Canadian Government to carefully re-think its external relations. This meant a more activist foreign policy that would have been unthinkable only a few short years before. It meant moving beyond Prime Minister Mackenzie King's exceedingly cautious and restrained pre-war foreign policy. Prior to 1939, King had focused primarily on relations with Britain and the US. As previously mentioned, through the 1920's and 1930's, on matters of European security, King was strongly inclined toward an isolationism not unlike that of the US. In fact, the diplomacy of both Europe and North America generally left a lot to be desired during the inter-war years. The poet W.H. Auden captured it well when he referred the "low dishonest decade" of the 1930's. Before, during and after the war, King kept a tight rein on foreign policy by serving as his own foreign minister. However, on September 4, 1946, he finally relinquished those duties when St. Laurent became Secretary of State for External Affairs Minister and Lester Pearson his Under-Secretary. The two men were very much in the vanguard of a new approach to foreign affairs for Canada. Reflecting on this period in his memoirs, Pearson recalled:

"Quite apart from my high regard for Mr. St. Laurent as a man, our view on the principles that should guide Canada's postwar foreign policy (was) very similar. We were both convinced that our country should play its full part in the international organization of peace and security."

Within months, that more activist policy was beginning to take shape, but it was more reactive than proactive. It can probably be said that Canadian grand strategy was
a reaction to Allied grand strategy and that Allied grand strategy was overwhelmingly driven by a response to Soviet grand strategy. As Stalin’s post-war plan became apparent, the Americans and the British were very much seized with the challenges of a new and very different strategic environment. A significant amount of strategic ambiguity and indecision, however, characterized the immediate post-war period. As Lester Pearson also observed:

“There was, of course, no effective Western response to Soviet policy in these early years; it appeared that Moscow's advance would not stop as she brought under her control hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory in Eastern and Central Europe and more than 90 millions of people.”

Outside of those countries it had overrun, the list of places where the Soviets were fomenting crises, attempting takeovers and just generally mischief-making was long. It included Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, France, Italy and Norway – and of course, Berlin. The situation was further complicated by the rapid de-mobilization of US, Canadian and British troops and the military impotence that followed. Meanwhile, the Soviets maintained their combat ready divisions.

The deep and abiding suspicions of the Soviet Union’s post-war designs were probably best captured in Winston Churchill’s speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. Referring to “these anxious and baffling times,” Churchill spoke of the threat to freedom, democracy and stability posed by Soviet expansionism. His speech, which included his ominous warning that: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent,” was an early clarion call for a new allied strategy led by the United States.
Less than two weeks before Churchill’s Fulton, Missouri speech, the US State Department received George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from the American Embassy in Moscow on February 22, 1946 containing his detailed analysis of Soviet intentions. His message included the shrewd observation that Soviet power was: “impervious to (the) logic of reason” and “highly sensitive to the logic of force.” Kennan never believed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. He was, however, convinced that military strength was imperative. Nevertheless, his suggested approach to the Soviet threat leaned heavily on what today would be described as “soft power.” He recommended that the US understand Soviet Communism, explain it to the public, maintain the health and vigour of US society, offer other nations a “positive and constructive” view of the world, and finally, hold firm to “our own methods and conceptions of human society.” The concluding words of the “Long Telegram” continue to have resonance today: “The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”

Kennan’s views circulated widely within the State Department and the Department of Defence throughout 1946 and 1947. It was not until he published “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (under the pseudonym ‘X’) in *Foreign Affairs* in July, 1947 that the word “containment” first appeared in public. As Kennan noted, “it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant *containment* of Russian expansive tendencies.” The first major US initiative which gave effect to containment came in a speech President Truman delivered to a Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947. The
Truman Doctrine gave financial and economic support to Greece and Turkey in the face of an armed internal Communist threat. It was quickly followed by the Marshall Plan in July 1947 which was intended to assist in the re-building of Europe and the strengthening of its economic foundations.

The military component of allied grand strategy began to take shape with the Treaty of Brussels signed in March, 1948 by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom. The treaty was a mutual intergovernmental self defence treaty which also promoted economic, cultural and social collaboration. This was followed in April of 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington which created NATO as an alliance for collective defence as defined by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Twelve countries signed the treaty including the five Treaty of Brussels states, as well as the United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland.

There can be no doubt that the most defining event for Allied and Canadian grand strategy in the early period of the Cold War was the formation of NATO. And the extent to which Canadian interests, values, needs and aspirations were captured in the treaty was an important litmus test for the success or failure of Canadian grand strategy. In order to make our presence felt in the world, it was essential that Canada leverage whatever power and influence it had with that of other similar sized powers alongside the United States. It was also essential that the Alliance give expression to the ‘community of shared values’ which, as noted above, included human rights, the rule of law and democratic governance. In that respect, the Canadian approach was very similar to what was being advocated by Kennan in the Long Telegram. That was one
side of the Atlantic coin. The other side meant, wherever possible, using the power and influence of Allies to put restraints on unfettered unilateral American power. If we return to Haglund’s concepts of the counterweight and Atlanticism, we can see how both were critical in defining Canadian policy toward collective security and the “North Atlantic community.” NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, summed it up well when he said the purpose of the Alliance was to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out. These were all objectives Canada could heartily endorse.

Canadian government officials were among the earliest promoters of an alliance. As early as May 13, 1946, Pearson had raised the issue at a lecture he gave at Princeton University. There were other strong statements made in favour of such an organization by St. Laurent, Escott Reid, Pearson’s second in command, and Mackenzie King himself. On September 18, 1947 St. Laurent delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly that many see as the birth of NATO. The speech gave voice to the dissatisfaction and frustration that existed among UN members and offered a potential solution to the problem of security in Western Europe.

On March 22, 1948 official diplomatic talks got under way in Washington between Britain, the US and Canada with a view to the establishment of an “Atlantic Security System.” From the start of the talks, the Canadian position was that whatever security organization was established had to be more than simply a military alliance. Taking their cue from the Treaty of Brussels, the Canadians wanted it to embody the strengthening of free institutions and have it promote stability and encourage economic cooperation. However, the option that seemed to find favour with the Americans was a simple unilateral declaration that an attack on any Western European country would be
regarded as an attack on the United States. The position taken by Canada was that this guarantee was both unsatisfactory and inadequate since it would not have put in place a real system of collective security involving mutual assistance. As Pearson wrote to King and St. Laurent on April 12, 1948:

“A unilateral guarantee smells of charity (in the worst sense of the word). The Western European democracies are not beggars asking for our charity, but are potential allies whose assistance we need in order to be able to defend ourselves.”

In the end, the Americans dropped the idea of a unilateral security guarantee for Western Europe and the British also moved off their position which was an attempt to create some distance between Europe and North America. Canadian officials, for their part, were successful in having Article II inserted into the final treaty – the non military component of the Alliance. Article II states:

“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”

In reflecting on the success of this episode of Canadian grand strategy, one is drawn back to all of St. Laurent’s principles: national unity, liberty, the rule of law, human values and the requirement that we accept our international responsibilities. Interestingly, it is St. Laurent’s first principle of national unity which seemed to have a very direct bearing on the inclusion of Article II in the NATO Charter. As Pearson stated in his Memoirs:

“One reason for our stand on this was, admittedly, political. We did not think that the Canadian people, especially in Quebec, would
whole-heartedly take on far-reaching external commitments if they were exclusively military in character; nor should they be asked to do so. These domestic considerations, however, were reinforced by our dedication … to the grand design of a developing Atlantic community, something which could never be realized through military commitments for collective security alone, urgent and important as these were at the time. Our effort to promote this grand design was an important chapter in the history of Canadian diplomacy.”

The establishment of NATO and the extent to which it reflected Canada’s interests and values was a tremendously important milestone for Canadian grand strategy. As we approach the 60th anniversary of NATO in 2009, the wisdom of the positions taken by King, St. Laurent and Pearson continue to have resonance for us today. It was truly a plan that spanned generations. In thinking about this important period, I believe very strongly that Canada’s foreign policy was energized, if I can use that word, by a very coherent, constructive and well formed grand strategy. I’m not going to re-read Kennedy’s definition of grand strategy, but I would hope you agree with me that it did possess both military and non-military components, it operated in war and peace and that its primary function was to preserve and enhance our nation’s long term best interests.

Looked at from another perspective, I believe if we examine this period on the basis of the five criteria for grand strategy that I mentioned earlier, it clearly satisfies all five conditions. First of all, the foreign policy strategy adopted by St. Laurent and Pearson had had very significant political support in Canada. The NATO treaty passed with the support of the Progressive Conservatives, the CCF and the Social Credit. There were two votes against it in the House of Commons. Secondly, there was a clear conception of threats, interests and values. Thirdly, there was a unity of purpose that
provided for both clarity and predictability for allies and rivals (both existing and potential). Even though the cohesion of the Alliance was sometimes in doubt (and I'm thinking here particularly of the French) generally speaking the Alliance was not susceptible to the divide and conquer tactics that Hitler had used prior to the Second World War.

Fourthly, there was a demonstrated willingness and an ability to apply elements of hard and soft power. While the preferred course of action was diplomacy and the strategy of containment, a little over a year after the NATO treaty was signed, many Alliance members including Canada found themselves both on the front lines of the Korean War and adding to the military capabilities of Western Europe in what became a 40 year standoff with Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops. From this perspective, Canadian grand strategy as per Kennedy’s definition was truly operating on every level from the political right through to the tactical. Fifth, it had to be flexible and subject to frequent reassessment. As part of Allied grand strategy involving the containment of Soviet expansion and in the post Cold War period, there has been significant flexibility and reassessment over the years throughout the Alliance. Canada has been part of a process re-assessment oftentimes to the chagrin of our allies.

Over the last two evenings, I have tried to whet your appetite on the subject of grand strategy generally and Canadian grand strategy more specifically. Tomorrow, in the last of this series of lectures, I propose to address the issue of whether or not Canada currently has a grand strategy and address some of the larger strategic issues which are on the horizon. I hope you will be able to join us.